





BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON CONSUMER FINANCIAL ABUSE 
DAVID COOPER† 
The whistleblower programs that the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank) created within the Securities and  
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) offer large monetary rewards for actionable information. These “bounties” 
have attracted commentary from the academy, the bar, and corporate America. 
Less often discussed is section 1057 of Dodd–Frank, which creates a private cause of 
action for informants who experience retaliation for reporting violations of federal 
consumer financial law to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 
These informants could be a valuable tool for discharging the CFPB’s supervisory 
and enforcement responsibilities. Unfortunately, the history of whistleblower 
protection under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley) demonstrates 
that section 1057 alone is not a viable long-term incentive for insiders to come 
forward. Therefore, this Comment argues that Congress or the CFPB should offer 
bounties for information that protects consumers’ financial welfare, much as existing  
Dodd–Frank programs remunerate individuals who contact law enforcement for 
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INTRODUCTION 
Las Vegas police found Tracy Lawrence’s body on November 28, 2011, 
the day she was scheduled to be sentenced to up to one year of jail time for 
notarizing the signature of an individual not in her presence.1 Earlier that 
month, Lawrence had tipped off the Attorney General of Nevada to 
widespread fraud at Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) (since redubbed 
Black Knight Financial Services),2 one of America’s largest loan processors.3 
In February 2014, foreclosure-ravaged Nevada became the fiftieth state to 
reach a civil settlement with LPS.4  
 
1 Foreclosure Fraud Whistleblower Found Dead, NBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2011, 2:51 PM), http:// 
usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/11/29/9099162-foreclosure-fraud-whistleblower-found-dead 
[hereinafter Foreclosure Fraud], archived at http://perma.cc/7CZB-R8QW. 
2 Id. 
3 See Ken Ritter, Nevada AG Takes Deal in Lender Fraud Civil Lawsuit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Feb. 14, 2014, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/nevada-ag-takes-deal-lender-fraud-civil-lawsuit 
(describing the allegation that LPS organized a “robo-signing” scheme across various states). 
4 Id. Lawrence’s testimony was also the linchpin of hundreds of criminal charges against two 
LPS loan officers, but the prosecution fell apart after her suicide. See id. (“A 306-count criminal 
case against two Southern California–based loan agents affiliated with the company collapsed a 
year ago, after a notary public [Lawrence] who claimed to have witnessed thousands of robosigning 
improprieties committed suicide.”). 
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LPS’s alleged misconduct consisted of churning out thousands of default 
notices with forged signatures and no review.5 Similar allegations underlay 
the $25 billion National Mortgage Settlement in February 2012, the “largest 
consumer financial protection settlement in United States history.”6 This 
settlement was also predicated on information revealed by whistleblowers, 
who claimed that a host of banks contracted for illegitimate foreclosure 
documents and forged reviewers’ signatures on the paperwork.7 
From its earliest days, American law has recognized the utility of enlisting 
private citizens as monitors by encouraging them to blow the whistle on 
violations of public mandates.8 Whistleblowing has been discussed and 
celebrated largely in the financial fraud context,9 although it also has been 
suggested as an enforcement device in other arenas. 10  Whistleblowing 
 
5 See Foreclosure Fraud, supra note 1 (noting that this practice “had thrown into question the 
legality of most Las Vegas home foreclosures in the past few years”). 
6 The National Mortgage Settlement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 17, 2012, 10:26 AM), 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/consumer_info/nms, archived at http://perma.cc/8RH3-
FCU7; see also Karen Weise, Mortgage Fraud Whistle-Blower Lynn Szymoniak Exposed Robosigning’s 
Sins, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www. businessweek.com/articles/2013-
09-12/mortgage-fraud-whistle-blower-lynn-szymoniak-exposed-robosignings-sins, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/L9HGF35A (describing one whistleblower’s allegations). 
7 See Weise, supra note 6 (noting that the National Mortgage Settlement reserved $228 million 
to pay whistleblowers’ qui tam claims). 
8 See Stephen M. Kohn, The Whistle-Blowers of 1777, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at A23  
(recounting how members of the Continental Navy reported their commodore’s torture of British 
sailors, which precipitated the July 1778 enactment of “America’s first whistle-blower protection law”). 
9 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government 
Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1809 (1996) (crediting the False Claims Act’s incentives 
for reporting information about fraudulent government contracts with “creat[ing] the most potent 
decentralized monitoring system in American public law”); Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes–Oxley’s 
Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1141 (describing 
how legitimized whistleblowing channels encourage employees to function as “active corporate 
monitors”); see also Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards 
Corporate Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS 55, 61-62 (2010) (arguing that whistleblowing is 
better than private litigation at exposing fraud early enough for regulators to minimize its impact 
on corporate well-being). But see Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical 
Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1920 (2007) (claiming that 
whistleblowing is ineffective unless “basic institutions of corporate governance” are already 
functional); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 43 (2002) (worrying that the “leverage” provided to 
employees by antiretaliation protection for securities fraud whistleblowers may disrupt the 
workplace). 
10 See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005) (recommending strong whistleblower protection as a 
component of effective labor regulation); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower 
Protection: A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 226-28 (2007) (proposing 
omnibus whistleblower protection under a wide range of federal statutes, including those 
punishing white collar crime and violations of antidiscrimination laws). 
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carries an intuitive appeal. Government agencies have limited resources, 
cannot afford to bring enforcement actions on the basis of incomplete 
information, and can only monitor so many entities effectively. Employees, 
by contrast, constantly watch these regulated companies and, as insiders, 
may have access to detailed information and key evidence. Convincing such 
insiders to report illegality provides supplemental supervision and fosters 
efficient enforcement.11 And as the stories of LPS and the National Mortgage 
Settlement illustrate, these principles equally apply to the universe of 
consumer credit regulation. 
Section 1057 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd–Frank) creates antiretaliation protection for employees 
of banks, mortgage servicers, payday lenders, debt collectors, and other 
consumer financial product or service providers, who blow the whistle on a 
violation of federal consumer financial laws or Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) regulations. 12  A robust whistleblowing program would 
complement the CFPB’s mandate. Like securities fraud, many violations of 
consumer financial protection laws are characterized by hidden infor-
mation.13 For example, inside information would be valuable in revealing 
forbidden kickbacks in the real estate and loan servicing industries, as well 
as the wide and vaguely defined world of fraud-like “unfair, deceptive or 
abusive act[s] or practice[s]” banned by the CFPB’s organic statute.14  
Even where the violation at issue could have been exposed by an agency 
investigation, or where specific instances are revealed through consumer 
complaints, an inside source could still add value by confirming the systemic 
nature of malfeasance and preserving evidence from spoliation—an investi-
gatory impediment that the CFPB can expect to arise more frequently in 
 
11 See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of Qui Tam, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1189 (2014) (“Whistle-blowing laws are enacted with the express 
purpose of inducing parties with private information about socially costly dishonest or illegal 
behavior to come forward to the poorly informed government.”); Alexander Dyck et al., Who 
Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2213, 2251 (2010) (examining alleged 
corporate frauds in the United States that took place between 1996 and 2004 in companies with 
more than 750 million dollars in assets, and concluding that fraud detection relies on several types 
of “nontraditional” actors, including employees); James Fisher et al., Privatizing Regulation: 
Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in the Financial Services Industries, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 117, 129 
(2000) (“Whistleblowers conserve government resources by focusing investigations and providing 
secret data or keys to understanding available data that otherwise may have been obtained only at an 
extremely high cost.”). 
12 Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1057, 124 Stat. 1376, 2031-35 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5567 (2012)). 
13 See The Identity Crisis at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 100 Banking Rep. (BNA) 
1, 3 (Jan. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Identity Crisis] (comparing federal consumer financial law violations 
to securities fraud). 
14 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012); see also infra notes 41 and 97 and accompanying text. 
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those markets, such as payday lending, in which consumer financial activities 
have rarely been subjected to federal oversight.15 The CFPB can spur the 
evolution of compliance culture in such industries by demonstrating early and 
consistent commitment to working with whistleblowers. 
However, Dodd–Frank did not institutionalize whistleblowing at the 
CFPB in the same way as it did at the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC), where the Act created an Office of the Whistleblower to award 
bounty payments to qualified informants.16 Therefore, the statute leaves it to 
the CFPB to gauge how much infrastructure to develop in order to encourage 
reporting and support informants. Because would-be tipsters often stay 
silent when they fear no one will act on their reports, the CFPB must 
cultivate a reputation for responsiveness in the early days of its nonbank 
supervisory activities. Furthermore, the CFPB must ensure that its program 
will be prepared to handle an increase in tip volume as the contours of the 
CFPB’s authority to prevent “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or  
practice[s]”17 are clarified over time. 
In light of the potential effectiveness of consumer financial whistleblowers, 
it is discouraging to see the CFPB backpedal on the lone public commitment 
it has made to facilitate whistleblowing and to see no further improvements 
mentioned in its latest strategic plan.18 Given that the CFPB promises to 
maintain informants’ confidentiality, it is possible that no news is good 
news, but a historical analogy to Sarbanes–Oxley’s whistleblower provision19 
suggests that this is unlikely. That provision, section 806,20 did not incentivize 
whistleblowing due to the persistent impotence of its antiretaliation cause 
of action.21  
 
15 See Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks at the Brookings Institute  
(Jan. 5, 2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/1/05%20cordray/0105_ 
cordray_remarks.pdf (“[The CFPB] will begin dealing face-to-face with [nonbank institutions, 
such as] payday lenders, mortgage servicers, mortgage originators, private student lenders, and 
other firms that often compete with banks but have largely escaped any meaningful federal 
oversight.”). 
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2012) (authorizing the SEC to pay an award, ranging from ten 
to thirty percent of the amount collected, to individuals who voluntarily provided original 
information to the SEC that led to a successful enforcement action). 
17 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012). 
18  See, e.g., infra Section II.B (recounting the CFPB’s apparent abandonment of its  
announced intention to create a web portal for whistleblower tips).  
19 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 124 Stat. 745, 802-04 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012)).  
20 Id.  
21 See infra Section III.A (describing statutory and judicial obstacles for plaintiff whistleblowers 
relying on section 806 to protect themselves against retaliation from employers). 
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The regulatory scheme surrounding Sarbanes–Oxley section 806  
requires whistleblowers to present complaints to the Department of Labor’s 
(DOL) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) before 
going to court.22 If OSHA finds a claim meritless, the whistleblower can 
appeal first to a DOL administrative law judge (ALJ), then to the Adminis-
trative Review Board (ARB), and finally to a federal court.23 Dodd–Frank’s 
section 1057 includes an identical exhaustion requirement.24 Throughout the 
Bush II administration, the DOL was notoriously hostile to Sarbanes–
Oxley whistleblowers. 25  ALJs strictly policed the requirements of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 regulations,26 while the ARB invented a series 
of new prerequisites to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 claims—for example, a 
requirement that the fraud reported be “material” for section 806 to cover 
the reporting employee.27 
Whereas the CFPB’s insulation from both Congress and the President 
makes it well-suited to maintain a commitment to whistleblowers, the 
DOL’s priorities are far more susceptible to the vagaries of the political 
branches, as the agency’s track record with Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 
attests. Dodd–Frank’s section 1057 will be similarly undependable in the 
long term if its effectiveness depends on the DOL. 
Even if Congress is unwilling to remove the DOL exhaustion requirement 
from Dodd–Frank’s section 1057 for fear of frivolous litigation, Congress 
could provide whistleblowers with a dependable incentive by means of a 
financial reward regime akin to the programs for securities, commodities, 
 
22 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103 (2014). 
23 Id. §§ 1980.105-7, .109-10, .112. 
24 12 U.S.C. § 5567(c) (2012). 
25 See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1773 
(2007) (suggesting that because Sarbanes–Oxley offers a weak incentive for whistleblowers, they 
should be paid financial rewards derived from fees levied on all exchange-listed companies); 
Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes–Oxley 
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 91 tbl.1 (2007) (finding that only 3.6% of 
the cases resolved at the initial OSHA investigation were decided in favor of employees and that 
employees prevailed 6.5% of the time at the ALJ level). 
26 See Meghan Elizabeth King, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd–Frank Amendments: The Case 
Against the New Amendments to Whistleblower Protection in Section 806 of Sarbanes–Oxley, 48 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1457, 1471 (2011) (observing that “ALJs [we]re very firm in enforcing th[e] ninety-
day deadline” for whistleblowers to file a complaint with OSHA); see also Beverley H. Earle & 
Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes–Oxley: A Proposal for 
Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 52 (2007) (arguing that there is no policy justification for discouraging 
whistleblowers from coming forward after the ninety-day statute of limitations expires). 
27 See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes–Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. 
REV. 1, 32-33 (2012) (recounting the ARB’s determination that the reported fraud must be 
“‘material,’ as defined by securities laws to mean information ‘that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider important in deciding how to vote’”). 
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futures, options, and derivatives whistleblowers under Dodd–Frank. In the 
absence of legislative action, this Comment argues that the CFPB should 
use its rulemaking power to achieve the same result. 
I begin by outlining the structure and objectives of the CFPB, as well as 
the protection its organic statute creates for whistleblowers. Next, I explain 
why the development of a vigorous consumer financial whistleblower 
scheme deserves more attention than it currently receives from the CFPB. 
After pointing out the crucial weakness in the existing incentive for informants 
by comparing Dodd–Frank section 1057 to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806, I 
conclude by arguing for a bounty system and discussing concerns related to 
implementing such a system. 
I. THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION ACT OF 2010 
Adopting a proposal originally advanced by Senator Elizabeth Warren,28 
Title X of the Dodd–Frank Act (the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 
2010, or the CFPA)29 established what amounts to a Consumer Product 
Safety Commission for the credit market: the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection (CFPB, or the Bureau).30 One provision of the CFPA, Dodd–Frank 
section 1057, 31  prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers who report 
violations of the Bureau’s regulations or the statutes it administers. Coupled 
with the CFPB’s structural independence, section 1057 creates the possibility 
for a potent consumer financial whistleblower program.  
 A. The Powerful and Insulated CFPB 
The Bureau consolidates the consumer financial responsibilities of seven 
preexisting agencies: the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
 
28 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 98 
(2008) (advocating for the creation of a Financial Product Safety Commission); Elizabeth Warren, 
Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 17 (proposing the creation of a Financial 
Product Safety Commission to protect consumers from “hidden tricks” in financial products); see 
also David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act 
of 2009 on Consumer Credit, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 277, 310-11 (2010) (surveying the 
“intellectual case” for the CFPB). 
29 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. 
X, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).  
30 See generally Lydia DePillis, A Watchdog Grows Up: The Inside Story of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, WASH. POST WONKBLOG ( Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/11/a-watchdog-grows-up-the-inside-story-of-the-consumer-financial-
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(HUD); the Federal Trade Commission (FTC); the now-defunct Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS); and the four “prudential regulators,”32 namely 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB),33  the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union 
Association (NCUA), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC).34 It oversees extensions of credit, loan servicing, real estate settlement 
services and appraisals, deposit-taking activities, financial data processing, 
the collection of consumer credit history and debt, and numerous other 
financial products and services35 that are “offered or provided for use by 
consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”36 The 
statute terms such subject matter “consumer financial product[s] or  
service[s].”37 
The Bureau’s mandate requires it to implement and enforce “Federal 
consumer financial law,” 38  a term that encompasses the CFPA itself, 
eighteen “enumerated consumer laws,”39 and rules or orders the Bureau 
issues pursuant to those authorities.40 Under the CFPA, the Bureau is 
empowered to define and prevent “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or 
practices” (UDAAPs) related to the classes of consumer financial services 
described above.41 The “enumerated consumer laws” the CFPB administers 
include the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA), the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 
(HMDA), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), 
and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).42  
 
32 12 U.S.C. § 5581(c) (2012). 
33 Although the CFPB is housed within the Federal Reserve, it is “essentially an independent 
executive agency.” DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD–
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 106 (2011). The FRB has no authority to 
control CFPB officers or review CFPB rules and orders. See 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(2) (2012) 
(limiting the power of the FRB over the CFPB). 
34 See 12 U.S.C. § 5581 (2012) (listing functions from other agencies that have been transferred 
to the CFPB). 
35 Id. § 5481(15) (defining “financial product or service”). 
36 Id. § 5481(5)(A). 
37 Id. For convenience, the remainder of this Comment refers interchangeably to “consumer 
financial products” and “consumer financial services.” 
38  Id. § 5511(a). 
39  Id. § 5481(12). 
40  Id. § 5481(14). 
41 See id. § 5531(a) (conferring authority to prevent UDAAPs); id. § 5531(b) (conferring 
authority to identify UDAAPs through notice and comment rulemaking). 
42 See id. § 5481(12) (enumerating the eighteen consumer laws). 
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The CFPB oversees both “covered person[s]” that offer consumer financial 
products, and entities that provide financial services to covered persons.43 
This class of covered persons includes many depository institutions already 
subject to oversight by the prudential regulators.44 The CFPB has primary 
rulemaking and enforcement authority over federal consumer financial law 
as applied to depositories with more than $10 billion in assets and affiliates 
of such depositories.45 
The Bureau is also authorized to supervise nondepository institutions 
that offer certain types of consumer financial products, including payday 
lenders, debt collectors, and residential mortgage brokers, originators, and 
servicers.46 The CFPB is the first federal regulator responsible for monitoring 
most of these “nonbanks.”47 Moreover, the Bureau can bring administrative 
actions and civil suits against an entity that it does not supervise, such as 
smaller participants in another consumer financial services market, if that 
entity violates the federal consumer financial laws.48 
 
43 See id. § 5481(6) (defining “covered person”). 
44 The CFPB’s regulations still apply to smaller depositories, but the prudential regulators 
retain primary supervisory and enforcement authority over such institutions. See id. § 5516(d) 
(describing the role of prudential regulators). However, if such an institution is “a service provider 
to a substantial number” of entities over which the CFPB has primary enforcement authority, that 
authority also extends to the service provider. Id. § 5516(e). Monitoring “safety and soundness” 
also remains the purview of the prudential regulators. See Memorandum of Understanding on 
Supervisory Coordination, May 16, 2012, at 4 n.6, available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
201206_CFPB_MOU_Supervisory_Coordination.pdf (listing examples of examination subject 
matters that fall outside the range of the Bureau’s supervisory activities). 
45 See 12 U.S.C. § 5515 (2012) (conferring supervision and enforcement authority over “very 
large banks, savings associations, and credit unions”); see also id. § 5512(a) (conferring rulemaking 
authority over federal consumer financial law). But see id. § 5517 (limiting the Bureau’s authority 
over, inter alia, accountants, attorneys, retail brokers, and insurance companies). 
46 See id. § 5514(a)(1)(A) (providing for CFPB supervision of all mortgage originators,  
brokers, and servicers, and those who engage in loan modification or foreclosure relief related to 
mortgages); id. § 5514(a)(1)(D) (providing for the same supervision by the CFPB for private 
education lenders); id. § 5514(a)(1)(E) (providing for the same supervision by the CFPB for 
payday lenders); see also id. § 5514(a)(1)(B) (permitting the CFPB to supervise “larger participants[,]” 
as defined through rulemaking in consultation with the FTC). “To date, the [CFPB] has issued 
three rules defining larger participants in the following markets: consumer reporting (effective 
September 2012), debt collection (effective January 2013), and student loan servicing (effective 
March 2014).” CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS 4 (2013), available 
at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201401_cfpb_supervisory-highlights-winter-2013.pdf. 
47 See Cordray, supra note 15 (explaining that the CFPB was created to “protect [consumers] 
against fraud” and to “ensure that they are treated fairly in the financial marketplace”). 
48 See 12 U.S.C. § 5563(a) (2012) (authorizing the CFPB to conduct administrative hearings 
and adjudication proceedings); id. § 5564(a) (permitting the CFPB to bring such civil actions). 
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Together with its expansive jurisdiction49 and array of enforcement 
tools, 50  the CFPB has several structural features designed to make it 
uniquely resistant to capture. The Bureau is shielded from both congressional 
and presidential influence because it is funded by a fixed percentage transfer 
from the FRB51 rather than by the appropriations process;52 its rulemakings 
are not subject to review by the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA);53 and its sole director serves a five-year term and can be 
removed only for cause.54 The CFPB can also “bring its own actions in 
federal court without having to go through the Department of Justice.”55  
The CFPB’s wealth of influence and dearth of political accountability 
continues to inspire energetic criticism.56 For example, on February 27, 
 
49 The CFPA also empowered the state attorneys general to enforce CFPB regulations  
issued under the Act, even against market participants the CFPB has no jurisdiction over. See 
CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 13.2.6 (8th ed. 
2012) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515(a)(c), 5552(a) (2012)) (“For example, state attorneys general, but 
not the CFPB, can enforce CFPB rules against banks, thrifts, and credit unions with assets under 
$10 billion.”). The state attorney general must give the Bureau notice, and the Bureau has the right 
to intervene and remove the action to federal court. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(b) (2012). 
50 Including, for example, the ability to issue Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs) before 
pursuing an investigation. See 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6 (2014) (governing CID procedure). 
51 See 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (requiring the FRB to provide the CFPB with 
twelve percent of its budget from fiscal year 2013 onward). It is worth noting that, like the other 
banking regulators, the Federal Reserve enjoys an income stream unmoored from the appropriations 
process. See id. § 243 (empowering the Board of Governors to satisfy the Federal Reserve’s 
operating budget through semiannual assessments of Federal Reserve banks).  
52 The CFPB director was also authorized to request up to $200 million in additional appropriated 
funds each fiscal year if he determined that the Bureau was underfunded, but that authorization 
expired at the beginning of fiscal year 2014. Id. § 5497(e)(1)-(2).  
53 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 (2012) (exempting independent regulatory agencies from the definition of “agency” 
for the purposes of OIRA review); see also 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2006) (defining “independent 
regulatory agency” to include the FRB). 
54 See 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(1) (2012) (establishing the director’s position); id. § 5491(c)(1) 
(providing for five-year term); id. § 5491(c)(3) (providing for-cause removal for the director). 
55 Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 15, 78 (2010) (citing Dodd–Frank Act § 1054(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5564(b) 
(2012))). 
56 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 889-90, 900 (2011–2012) 
(discussing the financial services industry’s campaign against the CFPB); David Francis, Critics 
Say Consumer Bureau Is an Overreaching Monster, FISCAL TIMES (May 30, 2013), 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/05/30/Critics-Say-Consumer-Bureau-is-an-
Overreaching-Monster, archived at http://perma.cc/S44F-44YN (describing accusations leveled at 
the CFPB by Republican senators and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); see also Evans & Wright, 
supra note 28, at 280 (labeling the CFPB a paternalistic “supernanny” agency); Todd Zywicki, The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 900-01 (2013) 
(accusing the CFPB of bureaucratically undermining its own mission to encourage simplicity in 
consumer finance). 
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2014, the House of Representatives passed the Consumer Financial Freedom 
and Washington Accountability Act, H.R. 3193, 57 a bill that would replace 
the CFPB’s Federal Reserve–derived funding with a yearly appropriation.58 
In expressing his support for the bill, House Financial Services Committee 
Chairman Representative Jeb Hensarling referred to the CFPB as 
“[a]rguably. . . the single most powerful and least accountable Federal 
agency in the history of our nation.”59 
H.R. 3193 is just one recent installment in the long-running efforts to 
disarm the CFPB.60 The agency was under attack before it got off the 
ground.61 Perhaps this is not surprising, given that “[u]nlike any other part 
of the Dodd–Frank Act, the Consumer Bureau . . . serve[s] as a  
 
57 Consumer Financial Freedom and Washington Accountability Act, H.R. 3193, 113th Cong. (2014). 
58 See Charles S. Clark, House Passes Bill to Revamp Consumer Agency, GOV’T EXECUTIVE 
(Mar. 3, 2014), available at http://www.govexec.com/management/2014/03/house-passes-bill-revamp-
consumer-agency/79735 (describing the proposed reform H.R. 3193 to increase accountability). 
59 Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., House to Consider CFPB Accountability 
Reforms This Week (Feb. 24, 2014), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/news/ 
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=371067.  
60 See Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,  
7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 40-41 (2012) (describing earlier bills offered by Republican 
lawmakers as symbolic calls for increased oversight of the CFPB). 
61 For example, now-Senator Elizabeth Warren, the natural choice to head the CFPB, was 
removed from consideration in the face of vociferous Republican opposition. See Eric W. Dolan, 
Larry Summers Helped Sink Elizabeth Warren’s Nomination to Head New Consumer Bureau, RAW 
STORY (Aug. 7, 2013, 8:57 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/08/07/larry-summers-helped-
sink-elizabeth-warrens-nomination-to-head-new-consumer-bureau, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
R5Z3-TV4W (identifying opposition to Senator Warren’s nomination). More than a year passed 
between current Director Richard Cordray’s recess appointment in January 2012 and his Senate 
confirmation. See Mary Beth Quirk, Senate Finally Confirms Richard Cordray as CFPB Director, 
CONSUMERIST ( July 16, 2013), http://consumerist.com/2013/07/16/senate-finally-confirms-richard-
cordray-as-cfpb-director, archived at http://perma.cc/G9GN-GDWV (congratulating Cordray on 
the “66-34 vote that finally confirmed him”). In fact, the legitimacy of the CFPB as a whole 
remains an open question, as a case challenging the constitutionality of the structural features 
outlined above is pending before the D.C. Circuit. See Final Opening Brief for the State 
Appellants, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, Nos. 13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 
2014), ECF No. 45; Final Opening Brief of Private Plaintiffs–Appellants, State Nat’l Bank of Big 
Spring v. Lew, Nos. 13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 2014), ECF No. 47; Final Brief for 
Appellees, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, Nos. 13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 9, 2014), 
ECF No. 44; see also State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127, 165 (D.D.C. 
2013) (finding that the plaintiff, a national bank, had not suffered cognizable injury-in-fact from the 
CFPB’s activities and therefore lacked standing to challenge the Bureau’s structure). Director 
Cordray, for his part, appears to be unfazed. See Richard Cordray, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at the National Association of Attorneys 
General (Feb. 26, 2014), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/ 
prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-at-the-national-association-of-attorneys-general 
(“This regime will govern the mortgage servicing market—including both the banks and their 
nonbank competitors—in perpetuity.”). 
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counterweight . . . limit[ing] the kinds of strategies that the largest banks 
can use to make profits.”62 That said, the CFPB’s conduct on the job has 
done little to mollify the consumer financial industry’s misgivings. Its 
tenure so far has been colored by aggression and a strong preference for 
regulating through informal guidance and enforcement actions, as opposed 
to notice-and-comment rulemaking.63 In particular, regulated entities have 
called for rulemakings to address the definition of “unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts or practices” under the CFPA.64 
 B. Section 1057 
In contrast to its supervision and enforcement actions, the CFPB’s  
whistleblower protections—one of its most interesting weapons—have been 
largely overlooked. Dodd–Frank Act section 1057 prohibits retaliation 
against a covered employee who, among other protected activities, reports 
what she reasonably believes to be a violation of federal consumer law, a 
CFPB regulation, or a CFPB order.65 The statute creates a private right of 
action for an employee who suffers retaliation for reporting wrongdoing to 
her employer, the CFPB, or another law enforcement agency.66 
Section 1057’s coverage is broad. It includes not only any employer who 
offers consumer financial products, but also employers who provide services 
to such offerors, even if the offeror does not control the service provider.67 
 
62 SKEEL, supra note 33, at 114.  
63 See, e.g., Martin Bishop, Regulatory: Collaborating to Solve the Vexing UDAAP Dilemma, 
INSIDECOUNSEL (May 1, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/05/01/regulatory-collaborating- 
to-solve-the-vexing-udaap, archived at http://perma.cc/UFJ4-7TDL (providing one attorney’s 
opinions on why the CFPB should engage in rulemaking). 
64 Id. 
65  See 12 U.S.C. § 5567(b)-(c) (2012) (defining the term “covered employee” as “any  
individual performing tasks related to the offering or provision of a consumer financial product or 
service,” and delineating categories of protected conduct). 
66 See id. § 5567(a) (banning any “covered person or service provider” from retaliating 
against any “covered employee” for protected conduct). The statute also protects employees who 
“filed, instituted, or caused to be filed” any federal consumer financial law “proceeding,” id. § 5567 
(a)(1)(3), which theoretically shelters an employee who blows the whistle to an affected consumer 
or to an enterprising plaintiff ’s attorney.  
67 12 U.S.C. § 5567(a)(1)(3); see also id. § 5481(6) (defining “covered person” to include offerors 
of consumer products and “any affiliate” who “acts as a service provider to such [offerors]”); id. 
§ 5481(26) (defining “service provider” as “any person that provides a material service to a covered 
person in connection with the offering . . . of a consumer financial product”(emphasis added)). 
This range is especially significant because the CFPB has stressed its intention to hold supervised 
entities liable for the malfeasance of third-party service providers. See CFPB to Hold Financial 
Institutions and their Service Providers Accountable, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr. 13, 2012), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-to-hold-financial-
institutions-and-their-service-providers-accountable, archived at http://perma.cc/JK8N-KVPW 
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Moreover, Dodd–Frank section 1057 governs conduct that other federal 
whistleblower statutes, including the False Claims Act (FCA) and the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), 
leave unregulated. The FCA allows relators to bring a qui tam68 lawsuit on 
the government’s behalf if they detect a fraudulent “request or demand” for 
federal assets. 69  Although the FCA therefore reaches some consumer 
finance cases that involve government initiatives such as the Home  
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 70  “[u]nfortunately, many 
banking [and] mortgage cases are not tied to any demand or request for 
money,” much less federal money.71 Similarly, because mortgage services 
are often provided by nonbank institutions, FIRREA’s whistleblower 
provisions also have limited applicability to this field; the statute only 
covers the conduct of federally insured depositories. 72  Neither federal 
 
(outlining the CFPB’s “expectation that supervised financial institutions have an effective process 
for managing the risks of service provided relationships,” and recommending that “supervised 
financial institutions take steps to ensure that business arrangements with service providers do not 
present unwarranted risks to consumers”); see also Marie-Charlotte Patterson, Spotlight on the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, INSIDECOUNSEL ( June 7, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel. 
com/2013/06/07/spotlight-on-the-consumer-financial-protection-bur, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
MNJ-56U7 (arguing that the key challenge the CFPB poses is understanding potential liability for 
suppliers and subcontractors). 
68 “Qui tam” is an abbreviation of “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,” 
which means “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” BLACK’S LAW  
DICTIONARY 1444 (10th ed. 2014). In modern usage, it refers to “[a]n action brought under a 
statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or some 
specified public institution will receive.” Id. 
69 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(b)(2), 3729(c), 3730(b) (2012). The Department of Justice (DOJ) may 
opt to join the relator’s suit, but the relator can proceed without government intervention. Id. 
§ 3730(c)(3). The relator is entitled to a percentage of any successful recovery, which varies 
depending on whether the DOJ intervenes. See id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2) (awarding fifteen to twenty-
five percent of the claim proceeds to the relator in government-joined actions and twenty-five to 
thirty percent of proceeds in actions in which the government does not join). 
70 See Jessica Dye, Whistleblower Says BofA Defrauded HAMP, REUTERS, Mar. 7, 2012, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/08/bank-of-america-whistleblower-idUSL2E8E804820120308 
(reporting on an FCA whistleblower complaint alleging fraud under the HAMP filed by a former 
employee of Urban Lending Solutions, a company that performed contract work for Bank of 
America and its loan servicing subsidiary). 
71 THAD M. GUYER & MELISSA KOVEN, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, BANKING 
SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY: UNDERSTANDING AND HANDLING THE COMPLEX “SOX PLUS 
ONE” WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIM 16 (2013) (citing Order, United States v. Countrywide Fin. 
Corp., No. 12-1422 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013)), available at http://www.whistleblower.org/ 
sites/default/files/BSA.pdf (pointing out that the Southern District of New York dismissed the 
FCA claims in a suit related to Countrywide’s fraud on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).  
72 12 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (2012); see also Brian Mahany, Mortgage Servicers Ripe for Whistleblowers, 
DUE DILIGENCE (Mar. 2, 2014, 2:37 AM), http://www.mahanyertl.com/mahanyertl/2014/ 
mortgage-servicers-ripe-whistleblowers, archived at http://perma.cc/C8FX-GHH8 (explaining the 
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statute covers the market segments for which CFPB enforcement authority 
generally represents a first taste of federal oversight, such as payday lending. 
And state law in this area is predictably patchwork.73  
Although it casts a commendably wide net, Dodd–Frank section 1057 is 
more notable for what it fails to do. The provision stands apart from the 
two other sets of whistleblower protections in the Dodd–Frank Act. Section 
922 provides incentives and protections for individuals who report violations 
of federal securities laws to the SEC.74 Another section, Section 924 of 
Dodd–Frank, directs the SEC to establish an Office of the Whistleblower 
(OWB) to administer this new informant program.75 Section 748 creates a 
similar program for tips regarding the federal commodities and futures 
statutes, and the associated regulations provide for a “Whistleblower Office” 
(WBO) within the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).76 
Both the CFTC program’s statute and its regulations substantially mirror 
those of the SEC.77  
Despite their similarities, the programs created under sections 748 and 
922 differ from section 1057’s scheme in several important respects. First, 
whistleblowers who relay original information to the CFTC or SEC are 
statutorily entitled to between ten to thirty percent of any recovery the 
agency attains based on that information, provided that the recovery 
exceeds $1 million.78 Section 1057 does not provide for a similar bounty 
payment. Second, and more germane to the immediate point, Dodd–Frank 
section 1057 does not establish a unit within the CFPB equivalent to the 
SEC’s OWB or the CFTC’s WBO for collecting tips. The CFPB has 
discretion over how much infrastructure to assemble around this modest 
incentive for consumer financial whistleblowers. 
 
difficulties of bringing whistleblower claims against nonbank mortgage servicers like Ocwen or 
Green Tree, two companies that the CFPB has targeted). 
73 See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, States of Pay: Emerging Trends in State Whistleblower Bounty 
Schemes, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 53, 70-71 (2012) (surveying state false claims laws). 
74 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). 
75 Id. § 78u-7. 
76 7 U.S.C. § 26 (2012) (creating the commodities informant program); 17 C.F.R. § 165.15(c) 
(2014) (delegating authority for most informant-related action to the head of the WBO). 
77 Compare 17 C.F.R. pt. 165 (2014) (codifying final CFTC bounty rules), with id. § 240.21F 
(codifying final SEC bounty rules). But see Douglas J. Davison et al., CFTC and SEC Whistleblower 
Bounties: Largely Similar but Important Differences Remain, 13 J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 36, 37 
(2012) (enumerating a series of fine-grained but “notable differences” between the programs, 
including the CFTC’s failure to mirror the SEC’s ban on duplicative recovery). 
78 7 U.S.C. § 26(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012). 
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II. WHISTLEBLOWING UNDER FEDERAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL LAW 
Developing this type of infrastructure for collecting tips would be a 
worthwhile investment. Although pursuing whistleblower tips is a reactive 
style of enforcement, the CFPB is already designed to respond to external 
complaints from angry consumers—so why not respond to complaints from 
members of the consumer financial services industry who might have inside 
information on developing species of deception and abuse?79 Many of these 
federal consumer financial law violations resemble fraud, which whistleblowers 
have proven to be helpful in exposing.80 Nevertheless, the CFPB does not 
currently devote substantial resources to facilitating such tips.  
 A. The Potential Value of Consumer Financial Services Informants 
Over a decade after the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals and 
subsequent passage of Sarbanes–Oxley, corporate financial fraud is still the 
iconic violation Americans associate with whistleblowers.81 And rightly so, 
perhaps: from August 2011 through the close of the 2014 fiscal year, the 
SEC’s new OWB received 1714 whistleblower tips related to “corporate 
disclosures and financials,” comprising 16.8% of the office’s 10,193 complaints 
and making this complaint category the most common type of allegation 
reported.82  
Turning to utility rather than volume, studies indicate that insider tips 
play a vital role in detecting fraud at large companies.83 The underlying 
dynamic at work here is not limited to situations where someone is cooking 
 
79 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 49, § 4.3.3.1 (“It is impossible to frame definitions which 
embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all 
known practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin 
over again.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.))). 
80 See supra note 19. 
81 See Adam Geller, The Whistleblower’s Unending Story, USA TODAY (Apr. 26, 2008, 12:24 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-04-26-3579244419_x.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4VSQ-ERTS (recalling the scandals of 2002, which the press dubbed as “the year 
of the whistleblower”). 
82 SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROGRAM 20, 27 (2014) [hereinafter OWB ANNUAL REPORT]. “Offering fraud” came in a close 
second at 1599 tips, or 15.7%. Id. 
83 See Dyck et. al., supra note 11, at 2226 (noting that, compared to other potential “fraud 
detectors,” employees of a company frequently act as whistleblowers, reporting fraud in 17% of the 
instances studied); see also ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS 
ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2010 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 16 (2010), available at 
http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/documents/rttn-2010.pdf (finding 
that tips were responsible for detecting over 40% of the organizational fraud reported by 
examiners from 2008 to 2010). 
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the books. Whistleblowers are valuable whenever a violation puts an 
enforcer at an informational disadvantage—that is, whenever a violation 
involves hidden information.84 
The discovery of hidden information characterizes many prosecutions 
for violations of federal consumer financial law.85 One example that recently 
garnered nationwide attention in the foreclosure context is the practice of 
“robo-signing,” or directing employees to rubber-stamp documents without 
meaningful review. 86  Whistleblowers could also be useful in exposing 
arrangements that violate the RESPA’s prohibition on kickbacks, a subject 
of increasing CFPB attention,87 or the TILA’s ban on “steering incentives.”88 
A former SEC enforcement attorney who was among the Bureau’s earliest 
hires89 has observed that the CFPA’s generalized ban on UDAAPs charges 
the CFPB with preventing yet another range of acts which shares much in 
common with securities fraud.90 And, to name a final example, the CFPA’s 
 
84 See Casey & Niblett, supra note 11, at 1208 (“Our analysis suggests that when there are 
sticky asymmetric information problems—which is, of course, the definition of hidden infor-
mation—the screening mechanism is important.”). 
85 The CFPB has admittedly found ways to enforce other statutes without requiring inside 
information. For example, the Bureau has come under fire from House Republicans for using its 
finding that auto lenders violated ECOA’s and Regulation B’s prohibition on discriminatory 
lending, arrived at by means of a disparate-impact theory and undisclosed methods of analysis, to 
force the lenders into high-value settlements. See Letter from Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, House 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., to Hon. Richard Cordray, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. (Mar. 7, 
2014), available at http://images.magnetmail.net/images/clients/CBA_/attach/IndirectAutoLending 
Letter3142014.pdf (detailing congressional efforts, beginning in May 2013, to get the CFPB to 
disclose the details of “the methodology the [CFPB] has adopted to determine whether fair 
lending violations exist in indirect auto lending” and threatening to invoke the House Committee’s 
compulsory process to obtain this information). 
86 See Complaint at 13, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 13-2025 
(D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2013) (defining “robo-signing” as “preparing, executing, notarizing, and filing 
affidavits . . . whose affiants lacked personal knowledge of the assertions in the affidavits and did 
not review any information or documentation to verify the assertions in such affidavits”); see also 
supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing settlement of a case involving forged reviewer 
signatures). 
87 See Brad Finkelstein, Former FHA Chief: RESPA Enforcement on the Way, NAT’L MORTGAGE 
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/dailybriefing/2010_560/ 
stricter-enforcement-respa-1029390-1.html?site=default_on, archived at http://perma.cc/B8NC-QUUP 
(quoting former Federal Housing Administration Commissioner Brian Montgomery as anticipating 
an uptick in RESPA enforcement “now that the CFPB has purview” over the statute). 
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c) (2012) (barring loan originators from paying loan officers or 
brokers compensation that varies based on loan terms other than the size of the principal). 
89 Professionals: Ronald L. Rubin, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, http://www.hunton.com/ 
ronald_rubin (last visited Jan. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7JUJ-EMDF. 
90 See Identity Crisis, supra note 13, at 3 (arguing that the CFPB shares more in common with 
the SEC than with the prudential regulators or FTC, in part because both agencies’ enforcement 
investigations target “fraudulent conduct” or “close relatives of fraudulent conduct,” namely 
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ban on originating loans without an evaluation of the borrowers’ ability to 
repay raises the possibility of loan officers reporting abuses similar to 
robosigning.91 
The deeper and more deliberately buried the violation, the greater the 
value added by an inside source. But whistleblowers can be a useful supervisory 
supplement even when the information they report could have been  
exposed by a government investigation. 92  CFPB examiners cannot be 
omnipresent, and the CFPB can examine only the largest depository 
institutions “on a continuing basis.”93 Moreover, even when the CFPB does 
engage in supervisory action, its detection of even relatively poorly concealed 
violations suffers from a problem with which the SEC is familiar: CFPB 
enforcement attorneys no longer accompany examiners during supervisory 
exams.94 
 
“unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices,” that are banned in “very general terms” by their 
respective organic statutes). 
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1), (a)(3) (2012) (requiring evaluation of ability to repay for loans 
other than qualified mortgages); see also JOSEPH L. BARLOON ET AL., SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, 
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROVISIONS IN THE DODD–FRANK WALL 
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 14, available at http://www.skadden.com/ 
newsletters/FSR_A_Consumer_Protection_Provisions_in_Dodd–Frank.pdf (noting employers’ 
concern regarding the relationship between section 1057 and the ability to repay rule). 
92 See Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public 
Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1159 (“Although an agency could 
obtain the same information [as provided by an informant], it would likely come at significant 
investigatory cost.”). 
93 Peggy Twohig & Steve Antonakes, A Guide to CFPB’s Supervision, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/guide-cfpb-supervision, 
archived at http://perma.cc/YU2K-9YWV. 
94 The CFPB used to send enforcement attorneys to on-site examinations, but after supervised 
interests protested the practice’s potential to impede “free exchange during the examination,” the 
Bureau changed its policy. CFPB OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE, FY2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
DIRECTOR 13 (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
201211_Ombuds_Office_Annual_Report.pdf; CFPB OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE, FY2013 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR 13-14 (Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
201311_cfpb_annual-report_ombuds-office.pdf. Matthew Martens, a former SEC enforcement 
attorney who led the insider trading case against Goldman’s “Fabulous Fab,” has spoken critically 
of the Commission’s comparable “bifurcation of the investigative process.” See Ben Protess, For 
S.E.C., a Much-Needed Win, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2014, at B1 (pointing to the “bureaucratic 
hurdles” presented by excluding enforcement attorneys from SEC investigations as one reason for 
the agency’s struggles at trial in the period leading up to the Tourre verdict). As described in 
subsection IV.A.2 infra, properly incentivized consumer financial services whistleblowers can help 
enforcement staff compensate for this division and the resulting limits on the staff ’s ability to 
investigate.  
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 B. Is Anybody Listening? 
In sum, section 1057 and the CFPB’s broad mandate create the desirable 
possibility of many covered employees coming forward with tips. However, 
the concern that their tip will not inspire a vigorous response deters many 
would-be whistleblowers from reporting to law enforcement. 95  Most 
informants also fear being perceived as “crazy” and therefore are less likely 
to report when the misconduct they observe is not definitively illegal.96 
Both of these fears should be mitigated over time as the CFPB clarifies the 
contours of the “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]”97 its 
organic statute prohibits, and as regulated employees become more familiar 
with the Bureau’s energetic brand of enforcement. But an uptick in tips will 
be counterproductive if the Bureau is not prepared and loses its reputation 
for responsiveness. 
What has the CFPB done for whistleblowers so far? In terms of publically 
disclosed activity, the answer is not much. The Bureau issued a bulletin and 
press release informing the public of Dodd–Frank section 1057 in late 
2011.98 Since then, the CFPB has made no observable effort to leverage the 
provision. There are no references to whistleblowing in the Bureau’s 
strategic plan through 2017, and the Bureau has not promulgated any 
regulations or taken any public enforcement actions related to section 
1057.99 
 
95 See Orly Lobel, Linking Prevention, Detection, and Whistleblowing: Principles for Designing 
Effective Reporting Systems, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 48 (2012) (“Perhaps most importantly, individuals 
will choose to remain bystanders in the face of misconduct if they believe that their reporting will 
not be treated seriously.” (citations omitted)); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: 
Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes–Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. 
REV. 91, 104 (2007) (describing whistleblowers’ fear of bureaucratic indifference); see also Fisher et 
al., supra note 11, at 130 (arguing that faith in law enforcement’s propensity to follow up actionable 
information is one of the “most important” ways to encourage whistleblowing). 
96 Rapp, supra note 95, at 122-23. 
97 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012). 
98 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 2011-05 (ENFORCEMENT AND 
FAIR LENDING), BUREAU INVITES WHISTLEBLOWER INFORMATION AND LAW ENFORCE-
MENT TIPS AND HIGHLIGHTS ANTI-RETALIATION PROTECTIONS (2011), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/12/CFPB_Enforcement_Bulletin_12-15-11.pdf (fleshing out 
statutory whistleblower protections in greater detail); Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
CFPB Begins Taking Whistleblower Tips (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www. 
consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-begins-taking-whistleblower-tips 
(announcing the option to anonymously report via telephone hotline or email and outlining 
consumer whistleblowers’ cause of action for retaliation). 
99  See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN, BUDGET, AND  
PERFORMANCE PLAN AND REPORT (Mar. 2014), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-plan-and-report.pdf (lacking any mention of whistleblowers). 
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At least one prominent attorney for consumer financial service providers 
was skeptical of the Bureau’s ability to attract substantial numbers of 
informants from the outset. 100  That skepticism proved warranted. The 
CFPB appears to have abandoned its only stated plan for drawing in more 
tips. A 2011 press release claimed that the CFPB planned to introduce an 
“online tips portal accessible through its website” in early 2012.101 Two years 
later, the “Whistleblowers” tab on consumerfinance.gov links to a CFPB 
blog page resembling the CFPB’s 2011 press release, but it makes no 
mention of plans for a web portal.102  
Given the utility of a robust consumer financial whistleblower program, 
why is the unfulfilled promise of another reporting channel the last we have 
heard about section 1057? Of course, the fact that the CFPB has never 
announced taking action on the basis of inside information does not mean 
that its hotline has not received occasional tips. The Bureau does promise to 
allow whistleblowers to request confidentiality or even remain anonymous 
to the extent permitted by law.103 Perhaps it opted not to set up a web 
portal for employee whistleblowers because the relevant staff members had 
their hands full with the tips coming through existing channels. But there 
are more likely explanations for the Bureau’s apparent abandonment of the 
online portal. An obvious one is that the CFPB did not receive many tips 
and lost confidence in section 1057’s ability to entice informants.  
If this is the case, the Bureau’s response is partially misguided, as  
whistleblowing may increase over time as the Bureau’s reputation develops 
and it clarifies standards through rulemaking. But a low volume of initial 
tips is not encouraging. As discussed in the following section, a historical 
comparison to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 suggests one reason Dodd–Frank 
 
100 See Alan S. Kaplinsky, Ballard Spahr LLP, CFPB’s Whistleblowers Announcement Is a 
Wake-up Call, CFPB MONITOR (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2011/12/20/ 
cfpb%E2%80%99s-whistleblowers-announcement-a-wake-up-call, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
F93Y-WR2E (“We do not anticipate a large number of these kinds of whistleblower reports.”). 
101 Press Release, supra note 98. 
102 Kent Markus, The CFPB Wants You to Blow the Whistle on Lawbreakers, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/the-cfpb-wants-you-to-
blow-the-whistle-on-lawbreakers, archived at http://perma.cc/CN5F-3ZPV. The CFPB has 
implemented a consumer complaint portal on its website, but as the whistleblower page stresses, 
consumer complaints are distinct from whistleblower tips. Id. Incidentally, the web portal has been 
the most heavily utilized channel for consumers to submit complaints. See CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE: A SNAPSHOT OF COMPLAINTS RECEIVED 4 (   June 19, 
2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201206_cfpb_shapshot_complaints-received.pdf 
(explaining that forty-four percent of all consumer complaints were lodged through the CFPB 
website, compared to eleven percent over the phone). Consumer usage therefore indicates that the 
whistleblower web portal may be a proposal worth reviving. 
103 Markus, supra note 102. 
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section 1057 may provide a less-than-ideal incentive for whistleblowers in 
the short term and illustrates a problem that may sabotage section 1057’s 
long-term viability. 
III. FIXING A CRACK IN THE INSULATION 
Even if the CFPB’s lack of accountability makes some people legally or 
politically queasy,104 it responds to one of the chief threats to a healthy 
whistleblower program: capture. Some scholars have questioned why we 
worry more about capture in this context than in others.105 There are two 
good responses to that concern: First, whistleblowers are often disgruntled 
employees who are easy to discredit and ignore, making it easier for an 
agency to abandon an externally imposed commitment to working with 
them. 106  Second, inconsistent administration undermines an agency’s 
reputation for responding to tips, and whistleblowers will not step forward 
unless they expect law enforcement to take action swiftly.107 Professor 
Richard Moberly credits this type of inconstancy with making the IRS’s 
program “dysfunctional,”108 and agency disinterest may explain why the 
SEC’s insider trading whistleblower program withered on the vine.109 
The CFPB’s structural independence is an important argument in favor 
of the enforcement potential of a CFPB-administered consumer financial 
 
104 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing attacks on the CFPB’s lack of 
accountability). But see Block-Lieb, supra note 60, at 27 (arguing that locking in a commitment to 
consumer financial protection is wise, because such legislation has “diffuse benefits and narrowly 
defined costs” that make enforcement challenging). 
105 See Casey & Niblett, supra note 11, at 1174-75 (“Our analysis suggests that worries of agency 
capture . . . are overemphasized.”). 
106 For example, the SEC’s failure to follow up on tips about several high-profile frauds, 
most notably Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, inspired scathing criticism. See, e.g., Matt Tiabbi, Why 
Didn't the SEC Catch Madoff? It Might Have Been Policy Not to, ROLLING STONE, May 31, 2013, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/why-didnt-the-sec-catch-madoff-it-might-
have-been-policy-not-to-20130531, archived at http://perma.cc/NT7C-EBD4 (characterizing the 
SEC as “aggressively clueless” and noting that the Commission ignored whistleblower Harry 
Markopolos’ timely and “extraordinarily detailed” attempt to inform it about Bernie Madoff ’s 
scheme). 
107 See supra note 95. 
108 Moberly, supra note 27, at 51. 
109 See Vanessa Castellina, Note, The New Financial Incentives and Expanded Anti-Retaliation 
Protections for Whistleblowers Created by Section 922 of the Dodd–Frank Act: Actual Progress or Just 
Politics?, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 187, 193 (2011) (discussing the SEC Office of the 
Inspector General’s assessment of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 
1988’s unsuccessful whistleblower program, an evaluation which concluded that “the SEC did not 
follow up with informants regarding their tips” (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC, REP. 
NO. 474, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC'S BOUNTY PROGRAM 5 (2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2010/474.pdf )).  
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whistleblower program. But there is a crack in section 1057’s insulation—the 
requirement that plaintiffs exhaust the DOL’s administrative remedies 
before bringing suit.  
Section 1057 shares this feature with Sarbanes–Oxley’s defensively 
minded whistleblower provision, section 806. A whistleblower who believes 
she has been retaliated against must file a complaint with the DOL and 
allow the Secretary of Labor an opportunity to investigate the claim before 
bringing suit in federal court.110 If the Secretary of Labor concludes that the 
claim is without merit, there is an appeals process through the DOL’s 
ARB.111 The statutory remedies are also identical: under either cause of 
action, a prevailing employee may receive back pay plus interest, reinstatement 
at the same seniority level, and compensation for special damages, including 
fees and costs.112 In fact, the two provisions are very similar. Section 1057 
bears a closer resemblance to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 than it does to its 
Dodd–Frank brethren, Dodd–Frank sections 922 and 748.113 Aside from 
nearly identical administrative enforcement mechanisms, section 1057 and 
section 806 share a focus on antiretaliation and an absence of statutory 
bounty provisions.  
 A. The Shortcomings of Pre-Amendment Sarbanes–Oxley Section 806 
Unfortunately, this is not a promising comparison. Sarbanes–Oxley  
section 806 is a provision with an inglorious past. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
as a whole was tarnished by its inability to forestall the financial crisis, but, 
prior to being altered by the Dodd–Frank amendments, Sarbanes–Oxley 
section 806 in particular was perceived as providing inadequate incentives 
for employee whistleblowers.114  
Scholars such as Professor Geoffrey Rapp interpret this as evidence that 
antiretaliation protection in general is not sufficient to convince employees 
to report violations.115 If this is true, the CFPB’s abandonment of a web 
 
110 12 U.S.C. § 5567(c)(1)(A) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (2012). 
111 12 U.S.C. § 5567(c)(2)(C) (2012).  
112 Id. § 5567(c)(4)(B), (D); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (2012). 
113 Compare Dodd–Frank Act § 1057, 12 U.S.C. § 5567 (2012), with Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
§ 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). 
114 See Dyck et al., supra note 11, at 2250-51 (finding that the percentage of employee  
whistleblowers in large U.S. fraud cases declined after 2002, and indicating “that [Sarbanes–Oxley’s] 
protection for whistleblowers has not increased employees’ incentives to come forward with cases 
of fraud”). 
115 See Rapp, supra note 95, at 118 (noting that there are “severe counterincentives that can 
convince insiders not to bring information about ongoing corporate and financial fraud to light”). 
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portal likely demonstrates its loss of faith in Dodd–Frank section 1057, 
suggesting that section 1057 is unlikely to attract many tips.  
Even if Professor Rapp is mistaken on this point, Sarbanes–Oxley  
section 806 demonstrates that the antiretaliation rights available to  
whistleblowers are unconvincing. Unfortunately, the same problem that 
dragged down Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 threatens to undermine the 
future of Dodd–Frank section 1057. 
Despite the outpouring of public support for whistleblowers that  
accompanied its enactment, Sarbanes–Oxley did a poor job of protecting 
informants from retaliation. Simply put, whistleblowers who brought claims 
under Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 almost never won. In 2007, Professor 
Moberly completed a comprehensive review of administrative decisions that 
were produced through the administrative process that claimants under 
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 must satisfy.116 He discovered that the Bush 
DOL was a “remarkably one-sided” boneyard for plaintiffs.117 By the time 
Professor Moberly repeated his study in 2012, the employee success rate at 
the OSHA investigation stage stood at just 1.8% over the lifetime of 
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806.118  
Professor Moberly and other academics identified a series of specific 
flaws in the statute’s language and administration. For example, the regulatory 
scheme of pre-Dodd–Frank section 806 included a tight ninety-day statute 
of limitations, a political compromise119 that led to the DOL rejecting many 
whistleblowers’ claims as untimely. 120  The most crucial problem with 
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 is that the ARB and the DOL’s ALJs have 
invented and imported harsh requirements for litigants, such as insisting that 
the fraud reported be “material” and aimed at shareholders, or reading  
section 806’s requirement that a whistleblower “reasonabl[y] belie[ve]” she is 
 
116 See Moberly, supra note 25, at 83-90 (outlining the timing of the study). 
117 See id. at 91 (describing the low success rates of whistleblowers at the ALJ and ARB level). 
118 See Moberly, supra note 27, at 29 (noting that OSHA decided in the employer’s favor 488 
times between 2006 and 2008 without a single employee victory). 
119 See Moberly, supra note 25, at 133-34 (explaining that Senators Chuck Grassley and  
Patrick Leahy shortened the original 180-day statute of limitations to “mollify a group of 
Republican senators”). 
120 See Earle & Madek, supra note 26, at 52 (arguing that there is no policy justification for a 
ninety-day statute of limitations, particularly if the goal of the statute is to encourage whistleblowers to 
come forward); Moberly, supra note 25, at 132 (“The study’s results indicate that OSHA and ALJs 
denied large numbers of whistleblowers Sarbanes–Oxley protection because of the restrictive 90-day 
statute of limitations.”); see also King, supra note 26, at 1471 (observing that “ALJs are very firm in 
enforcing this ninety-day deadline”).  
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reporting a securities violation to exclude whistleblowers who come forward 
regarding potential or imminent violations.121 
B. Undermining the Lock-In Effect 
Dodd–Frank made several amendments to section 806, taking aim at 
specific problems such as the statute of limitations. The same corrective 
measures were incorporated into Dodd–Frank section 1057. Section 1057 
and amended Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 now include a 180-day statute of 
limitations.  
However, the state of the DOL is probably the most salient change in 
the current environment for whistleblowers. David Michaels, whom 
President Obama appointed Assistant Secretary of Labor in charge of 
OSHA, acknowledged that OSHA’s Whistleblower Protection Program is 
“clearly not functioning well.”122 He has since engaged in reforms, including 
updating the OSHA investigation manual and relocating OSHA within the 
DOL.123 Under the new board of the ARB, which was selected by Secretary 
of Labor Hilda Solis, another President Obama appointee, the restrictive 
additions to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 were trimmed away, and plaintiffs 
are now winning more cases.124 Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 itself seems to 
be enjoying a resurgence under the new guard.125 In 2011, two whistleblowers 
won a $2.2 million jury verdict in a section 806 suit.126 More recently, a 
former Playboy employee, Catherine Zulfer, collected six million dollars, 
the largest verdict ever doled out under the provision.127 
 
121 Moberly, supra note 27, at 33. 
122 Id. at 40 (quoting Letter from David Michaels, Assistant Sec’y, OSHA, to OSHA  
Personnel ( July 19, 2010), available at http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/Michaels_vision.html). 
123 Id. 
124 See id. at 43 (noting that the new ARB removed the Bush-era requirement that whistleblowers 
“definitively and specifically” articulate a statement of a material securities violation). 
125 See generally Miranda Tolar, Whistleblower Claims in the Corporate Context: An Employer’s 
Perspective, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS: LEADING LAWYERS ON 
ANALYZING POTENTIAL CLAIMS, NAVIGATING RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND BUILDING 
AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE ( Jo Alice Darden ed., 2010) (outlining the recent amendments Congress 
has made to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act “to provide more protection to corporate employees”). 
126 See Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., No. 04-0703, 2011 WL 2118637, at *1, *19 (D. Nev. 
May 24, 2011) (affirming the $2.2 million jury verdict and ordering the employer to pay an 
additional $2.4 million in attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest). 
127 Special Verdict Form at 2, Zulfer v. Playboy Enters., Inc., No. 12-8263 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 
5, 2014); L.A. Ross, Playboy Must Pay $6 Million in Largest Federal Whistleblower Verdict, CHI. TRIB. 
(Mar. 6, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-03-06/news/chi-playboy-whistleblower-
20140306_1_whistleblower-jury-playboy-enterprises, archived at http://perma.cc/34JQ-7HB4 
(elaborating on Zulfer’s case against Playboy). 
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Changes like this would be helpful over the long term—if they stuck. 
Unfortunately, however, the tweaks reflected in Dodd–Frank’s amendments 
to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 are putting out fires instead of preventing 
them. The overriding lesson of both Sarbanes–Oxley section 806’s  
pre-amendment futility and the sudden uptick in whistleblowers’ post-
amendment success is, as Professor Moberly puts it, that “[w]e should be 
uneasy that the actions of whoever is in power could so easily determine the 
success or failure of a whistleblowing system.”128 Section 1057 still has 
plenty of hooks from which future ARB board members can hang obstructions, 
including the requirement that a whistleblower have a reasonable belief that 
she is reporting a violation of consumer financial law. In short, the DOL 
exhaustion requirement undoes much of the good that the CFPB’s structure 
could effectuate in terms of sustained commitment to a whistleblower 
program.129 
 IV. CONSUMER FINANCIAL BOUNTY HUNTERS 
Depending on how broad the lesson of Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 
sweeps, Congress might be able to adequately incentivize consumer financial 
whistleblowers by amending Dodd–Frank section 1057. Unfortunately, the 
obvious “fixes,” such as transferring investigative and adjudicatory authority 
over section 1057’s administrative process to the CFPB or eliminating the 
exhaustion requirement entirely, present issues of frivolous litigation and 
increased administrative costs, respectively.130 And if, as Professor Rapp 
 
128 Moberly, supra note 27, at 45. 
129 See Barkow, supra note 55, at 51 (“If the executive agency has the authority to veto or 
dictate the insulated agency’s policies, the other design features of the insulated agency are 
meaningless because the insulated agency answers to a political entity that shares none of its 
insulating features.”). 
130  Transferring OSHA’s Dodd–Frank section 1057 investigation responsibilities to the 
CFPB sounds promising at first blush. Aside from encouraging the CFPB to make further 
investments in a whistleblower program, transfer would enhance investigative efficiency and 
competency. As it stands, a key element for protected activity under section 1057 is the employee’s 
“reasonable belief ” that the conduct she reports violated federal consumer financial protection law. 
Especially if the definition of the UDAAPs banned by the CFPB continues to evolve over time, 
investigators will need experience with consumer financial law and products in order to do a large 
part of their job. Even without the reasonable belief requirement, CFPB personnel gain the most 
synergistic insight from investigating the entities that they regulate, and giving CFPB personnel 
direct information on these claims streamlines CFPB intervention in appropriate suits, such as 
where a putative UDAAP is at issue. 
The problem with this move, however, is that shifting only investigatory responsibility to the 
CFPB does not fully cordon the DOL’s influence. Because the CFPA is an article of federal 
consumer financial law and section 1057 is a component of the CFPA and prohibits retaliation in 
general terms, the CFPB could use its enforcement powers to directly resolve complaints that its 
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argues, antiretaliation provisions are inherently poor motivators,131 these 
costly solutions may not generate corresponding benefits. The better course 
is to create a Bureau-administered incentive that is less historically dubious 
than antiretaliation protection: a system for rewarding informants with 
monetary bounties. 
I do not discuss the political feasibility of achieving this reform through 
legislation here.132 But, in the absence of congressional action, the CFPB’s 
own rulemaking power offers another possible method of creating a bounty 
system. 133 After outlining the case for bounties, I discuss the CFPB’s 
 
investigators concluded had merit. See 12 U.S.C. § 5567(a) (2012) (“No covered person or service 
provider shall terminate or in any other way discriminate against . . . any covered employee.” 
(emphasis added)). However, for other complaints, including false negatives, the appeals process 
would continue to run through the DOL’s ALJs and the ARB. Truly divorcing Dodd–Frank 
section 1057’s exhaustion requirement from the DOL would necessitate not only hiring or 
transferring a new contingent of CFPB investigators but also creating a whole new adjudicatory 
system within the CFPB for the sole purpose of resolving section 1057 complaints.  
Instead of incurring this substantial expense, Congress could simply eliminate the administrative 
exhaustion requirement altogether, as it did for claims under the new securities and commodities 
whistleblower provisions. For examples of statutes without an exhaustion requirement, see 7 
U.S.C. § 26 (2012) and 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). The chief objection to this approach is that it 
opens the door to frivolous complaints that the exhaustion requirement sought to address in the 
first place.  
An appropriately designed bounty system can avoid both of these problems with a reformed 
antiretaliation cause of action. If the CFPB makes the final decision whether to take enforcement 
action based on a tip, there is no risk of frivolous private litigation. As for costs, whistleblowers 
themselves can be compensated with a percentage of the recoveries that they precipitate, and the 
cost of additional CFPB enforcement attorneys pales in comparison to the cost of creating a 
miniature DOL exclusively dedicated to Dodd–Frank section 1057. 
131 See Rapp, supra note 92, at 113 (arguing that Sarbanes–Oxley has failed “to generate  
sufficient incentives for whistleblowers”). 
132 That said, regulated industries and lawmakers who represent their interests should  
welcome changes that encourage the CFPB to adopt a more reactive approach. Armed with a 
productive whistleblower program, the CFPB would be more likely to set clear standards through 
rulemaking rather than murky enforcement and supervisory actions. With more consistent access 
to inside information, the Bureau would also be more likely to rely on tangible evidence of 
wrongdoing and less likely to engage in controversial techniques, such as enforcing ECOA by 
means of undisclosed formulae. 
133 The Bureau also has less dramatic options available for signaling its commitment to 
Dodd–Frank section 1057, but these measures are fairly unsatisfying. For instance, the CFPB 
could adopt a policy of exercising its independent authority to enforce section 1057 and use claims 
that OSHA deems meritless as a jumping-off point for its own investigation. The Chief of the 
SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower has announced his office’s intention to directly enforce the 
antiretaliation provisions connected to its program when it has the opportunity to do so. See 
Rachel Louise Ensign, Q&A: Sean McKessy, Chief, SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower, WALL ST. J. 
RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Sept. 24, 2013, 12:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/ 
2013/09/24/q-a-sean-mckessy-chief-of-the-secs-office-of-the-whistleblower, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
EK5T-VRFV (declaring that the OWB is “actively looking for ways to be proactive in pursuing, 
under appropriate circumstances, a retaliation claim, either as an add-on to an instance where 
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rulemaking options and conclude with a brief survey of design concerns that 
would be relevant to either a legislatively or administratively created 
program. 
 A. The Argument for CFPB Whistleblower Bounties 
An in-house CFPB bounty program, resembling the regimes under Dodd–
Frank sections 748 and 922 for commodities and securities whistleblowers, 
would provide three principle benefits.  
1. Offering an Effective Incentive 
First, such a program would ensure a reliable long-term incentive for 
consumer financial whistleblowers. As outlined above, Dodd–Frank section 
1057’s antiretaliation cause of action is the only positive incentive federal 
law currently offers to encourage such reporting, and its efficacy relies on 
the DOL, the agency that disarmed section 1057’s closest historical analogue 
for a decade. Although the CFPB’s insulation does not immunize it from 
capture by regulated interests,134 the Bureau is well-built to resist the type 
 
there was substance to the underlying report, but also if we are given evidence that a person 
reported to us in good faith and it turned out that they were wrong”).  
This tactic would become costly and duplicative in the long run, and may not otherwise be 
necessary in the immediate future because of the current composition of the DOL. Another, less 
resource-intensive option would be for the CFPB to harness its existing amicus program and 
participate in suitable proceedings as amicus curiae. See Amicus Program, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/amicus (last visited Sept. 6, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7JTV-6RU7 (listing all of the cases in which the CFPB participates as a friend of 
the court and inviting suggestions for cases in which to submit briefs). OSHA has not finalized its 
rules of procedure for Dodd–Frank section 1057 retaliation complaints, but those rules will likely 
give the CFPB the right to participate in this way. The analogous rules for complaints under 
amended Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 give the SEC the right to “participate as a party or as 
amicus curiae at any time in the proceeding” at its discretion. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.108(a)(1) (2014).  
Even if the CFPB’s input in some of these cases consists of black letter recitals of consumer 
financial law, the filings might send a message to the plaintiffs’ bar. Plaintiffs’ attorneys have some 
motivation to monitor Dodd–Frank section 1057, because the statute provides for fee awards to a 
successful employee at both the administrative and judicial levels. See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5567(c)(4)(B)(ii) (2012) (granting fee awards at the administrative level); id. § 5567(c)(5)(C) 
(granting fee awards at the judicial level). But neither amicus briefs nor direct enforcement 
initiatives signal long-term commitment as reliably as would a schedule of guaranteed bounty 
payments, and both options require an existing pool of Dodd–Frank section 1057 complaints to 
use as a starting point. 
134 For example, critics have pointed to Raj Date’s transition from a deputy director position 
at the CFPB to a mortgage origination startup as a foreshadowing of such troublesome coziness. 
See Nick Summers, A Consumer Hero Returns to Wall Street, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 
17, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-17/former-cfpb-deputy-raj-date-launches-
for-profit-financial-startup, archived at http://perma.cc/3YT6-QVTD (considering the implications 
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of executive influence that compromised DOL’s administration of  
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806.135 Providing an additional incentive parallel to 
Dodd–Frank section 1057, but administered by the CFPB, would make 
consumer financial whistleblowing less likely to wane with shifts in  
presidential priorities.  
2. Functional Consolidation  
Second, a system that allows the CFPB to distribute financial awards to 
cooperative consumer financial services employees unites several key facets 
of the whistleblowing process within a single agency: (1) the motivation for 
making an initial report, as described in the preceding paragraph; (2) a law 
enforcer’s ability to take remedial action and acquire expertise in directing 
further investigations of potential violations; and (3) a mechanism for 
motivating further assistance from informants. 
For an illustration of how this consolidation could generate more efficient 
enforcement, consider the CFPB’s November 2013 action against Cash 
America International, Inc. (CAI).136 The Bureau discovered that CAI was 
engaged in robosigning court documents from debt collection suits; that is, 
the company ordered its employees to “stamp a lawyer’s signature” on 
materials without reviewing them.137 The agency went on to extract an 
additional $5 million fine after CAI employees confessed that their managers 
had “coached them on what to say to [CFPB] examiners” and “instructed 
[them] to shred files and erase calls” while the CFPB examination was 
pending.138  
It is not surprising that the CFPB’s first public enforcement action 
against a payday lender was also the first CFPB enforcement action where 
the subject failed to “comply fully.”139 CAI is “one of the largest short-term, 
 
of Washington, D.C.’s revolving door in light of Date’s transition from the public to private 
sector). But see David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 531 
(criticizing abstract antipathy toward law enforcement officials taking private-sector jobs and 
presenting a study of prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of 
New York that indicated no correlation between career success and “laxity on regulated industry”). 
135 See supra text accompanying notes 128-132 (discussing how Congress could use the lessons 
of Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 to amend Dodd–Frank section 1057). 
136  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, at 11 (describing the CFPB’s enforcement 
action against CAI). 
137 Danielle Douglas, Payday Lender Cash America Fined Over Claims of Robo-signing, Gouging 




139  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, at 12. 
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small-dollar lenders in the country,”140 yet its internal controls were inadequate 
at best. For most payday lenders, the CFPB is the company’s first taste of 
not only a federal banking regulator, but of federal supervision in general.141 
Some segments of the market, such as tribal lenders,142 had previously 
operated outside of state regulation as well.143 The CFPB may encounter 
greater obstinacy from these smaller, newly overseen firms as it continues to 
address payday lending and to expand its oversight of nonbanks generally. 
In this environment, where spoliation of evidence is a genuine risk,  
whistleblowers can provide a valuable pipeline for information that would 
be ripe for destruction by other internal actors if the Bureau notified the 
consumer financial services provider of an imminent examination.144 
Standing alone, antiretaliation protection is a poor tool for convincing 
employees to go the extra mile and secure evidence for the CFPB. This 
conduct could expose the employee to numerous vexations, including 
possible civil or criminal liability for “‘stealing’ the evidence used to prove 
the employer’s wrongdoing.”145 And although a whistleblower’s “theft” of 
 
140 Id. at 11. Cash America is also a publicly traded company (NYSE: CSH). 
141 See Cordray, supra note 15 (noting that “[s]ince most of these businesses are not used to 
any federal oversight, [the CFPB’s] new supervision program may be a challenge for them”). 
142 Together with legitimate tribal businesses, regulators are concerned that unaffiliated 
payday lenders use so-called “rent-a-tribe” schemes to evade state oversight. See Jessica Silver-
Greenberg & Rachel Abrams, Costly Loans Are Drawing Attention From States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 
2014, at B1 (contending that some lenders devise innovative ways to skirt laws); Daniel Wagner, 
Six Federal Agencies Are Investigating Online Payday Lenders, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Aug. 8, 
2013, 11:12 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/08/08/13145/six-federal-agencies-are-investigating- 
online-payday-lenders, archived at http://perma.cc/66TR-6C3F (describing a millionaire motorsport 
driver’s involvement in “rent-a-tribe” arrangements). 
143 Federal consumer protection laws govern tribal businesses. See CAROLYN L. CARTER ET 
AL., CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION: CREDIT CARDS, PAYDAY LOANS, AUTO FINANCE AND 
OTHER NON-MORTGAGE CREDIT § 9.6.3.2a (1st ed. 2013 supp.) (“[Tribal] businesses may not 
assert sovereign immunity against the United States.”).  
144 Cf. Identity Crisis, supra note 13, at 8 (noting that when the CFPB investigates “relatively 
small consumer scam[s]” there is a real possibility that the investigation’s subjects will “fire up 
their shredders and wipe their hard drives clean before the CFPB’s investigators can collect 
evidence of the illegal practices”). The author of the BNA Banking Report, Ronald L. Rubin, 
doubts that “the majority” of the entities that the CFPB investigates are brazen enough to destroy 
evidence in the face of potential criminal liability for obstruction of justice. Id. However, he 
argues that a CID carries no additional deterrent threat in such circumstances, and “the only way 
to guarantee document preservation” would be “to have the FBI or some other police force raid 
[the company’s] offices.” Id. Rubin was writing in the context of the Bureau’s skeletal whistleblower 
program. Improvements to that model, which encourage consumer financial services informants to 
cooperate with the Bureau by preserving and expropriating evidence, would provide an alternative 
to the dramatic measures to which Rubin alludes. 
145 Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform Versus 
Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 186 n.19 (2007) (citing TOM DEVINE, THE WHISTLEBLOWER'S 
SURVIVAL GUIDE: COURAGE WITHOUT MARTYRDOM 28-32, 35-36 (1997)). 
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nonprivileged, non-trade-secret company documents should be protected 
activity under Dodd–Frank section 1057 (at least to the extent that a 
whistleblower acts at the CFPB’s direction), an employee who obtains 
documents without being discovered by her employer but is later terminated 
for other protected activity could find her remedies in a subsequent  
antiretaliation suit limited by the “after-acquired evidence” doctrine.146 
Financial awards incentivize further digging and perseverance in the face of 
these risks and in the face of management obfuscation generally.147  
On a related note, a bounty system that rewards whistleblowers for  
continuing to assist the CFPB could mitigate the difficulties that flow from 
the rigid bifurcation of the Bureau’s supervisory and enforcement functions. 
Although the CFPB houses its Office of Supervision and Office of  
Enforcement within the same division, 148  the terms of the Bureau’s  
Enforcement Action Process (EAP) ensure that there is “minimal functional 
overlap” between the two offices.149 A particularly onerous aspect of the 
EAP bans “information gathering contact” between Enforcement attorneys 
and persons not on the Bureau’s payroll until the CFPB begins a formal 
investigation.150 Because the Office of Enforcement’s preliminary investigatory 
options are so limited, the office ends up opening formal investigations with 
lengthy, unfocused CIDs that inflict “significant legal expenses” on subjects 
as they scramble to prepare for initial discussions with CFPB staff.151  
 
146  See DAVID J. MARSHALL & ABIGAIL COOK-MACK, PURLOINED DOCUMENTS,  
CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYER DATA, AND COUNTERCLAIMS IN WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION 
CASES 22 (2013), available at http://www.kmblegal.com/publications/purloined-documents-
confidential-employer-data-and-counterclaims-in-whistleblower-retaliation-cases-2 (noting that 
“[g]enerally, neither reinstatement nor front pay is considered [an] appropriate [remedy]” when an 
employer later discovers evidence of misconduct, such as purloining confidential documents, that 
would have justified terminating the employee “if it had been discovered at the time [the 
misconduct] occurred”). 
147 See Rapp, supra note 95, at 136 (arguing that, although Enron’s management was able to 
“block[]” concerned employees in the absence of a “financial incentive [for the employees] to go 
public,” a system of monetary awards “offers incentives for whistleblowers to persist even in the 
face of deliberate efforts by fraudsters to suppress information about fraudulent activity”).  
148 That division is known as the Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending Division 
(SEFL). See Identity Crisis, supra note 13, at 1 (describing the organizational structure of the CFPB). 
149 See id. at 4 (attributing this result to tension between the “examination model” familiar to 
those who head the Office of Supervision, and the litigation-centric approach of the CFPB’s senior 
Office of Enforcement staff, who are veterans of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 5; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c) (2014) (requiring the recipient of a CID and Bureau 
staff to “meet and confer” no more than ten days after the receipt of the CID). 
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Whistleblowers, however, are exempt from the EAP’s restriction on  
pre-investigation contact with extra-agency sources.152 The more information 
the Office of Enforcement can convince whistleblowers to gather and 
divulge, the less the office’s target selection suffers from its disconnect with 
the Office of Supervision. Formal investigations can open with narrowly 
tailored CIDs to which recipients can respond at a more measured pace, 
without wasting resources on needless production. Furthermore, whistleblowers 
can also expose violations of federal consumer financial law committed by 
entities that are not subject to CFPB supervision. While the Bureau has the 
authority to punish these entities,153 it often has no mechanism to detect their 
violations, aside from consumer complaints. 
3. Shaping Compliance Culture 
In addition to highlighting the evidence-gathering advantages whistleblowers 
can offer, the Cash America action also points to the third important benefit 
of a CFPB bounty system: spurring the development of a compliant culture 
in segments of the Bureau’s enforcement roster that are unacquainted with 
government oversight. This benefit, however, comes hand-in-hand with two 
serious arguments against bounty programs. 
First, critics of the SEC’s Dodd–Frank bounty program worry that 
offering a monetary reward for original information will lead to an influx of 
spurious or underdeveloped tips, forcing the agency to divert resources to 
screening these unhelpful complaints. As Professors Casey and Niblett 
suggest, the SEC’s Dodd–Frank whistleblower program responds to a 
nonexistent problem: the SEC already received a tremendous number of 
private complaints before implementing the program, and, according to the 
professors, using bounties to attract more information ignores the real goal 
of attracting higher quality information.154 
Casey and Niblett’s argument may be a valid critique of the SEC’s  
program, but it is less damning when applied to a hypothetical CFPB 
 
152 See Identity Crisis, supra note 13, at 4-5 (pointing out that the Office of Enforcement can 
gather information from whistleblowers and consumers before instituting formal proceedings). 
153 See 12 U.S.C. § 5563(a) (2012) (authorizing CFPB to conduct hearings and adjudication 
proceedings against “any person” who violates federal consumer financial law); id. § 5564(a) 
(authorizing the CFPB to take the same steps when bringing civil actions); see also Identity Crisis, 
supra note 13, at 3 (noting that like the SEC Enforcement Division, “CFPB Enforcement conducts 
a high volume of investigations of individuals or businesses that are not subject to the Bureau’s 
supervisory oversight”). 
154 See Casey & Niblett, supra note 11, at 1207 (“Encouraging whistle-blowing by allowing 
anonymous reporting to the SEC without substituting in other costs[ ] will encourage weaker 
information, resulting in information overload for the regulator.”). 
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regime. In terms of complainant interest without bounties, the two agencies 
stand on very different footing: the SEC is an American institution that 
celebrated its eightieth birthday in June 2014, whereas the CFPB is a  
“start-up”155 that turned three in July 2014.156 Although the Bureau has 
succeeded in attracting a high volume of consumer complaints,157 there is no 
evidence of comparably vigorous reporting from consumer financial services 
insiders.158 Left unbalanced, reliance on outsider complaints will push the 
CFPB away from enforcement of fraud-like violations that involve significant 
information asymmetries and toward practices akin to its controversial 
“disparate impact” approach to fair lending under the ECOA.159 The idea 
that a bounty system incentivizes the production of underdeveloped tips, 
rather than motivating whistleblowers to collect more quality information, 
necessarily depends on the specifics of that system.160 The Bureau’s system 
should focus on rewarding whistleblowers for gathering substantiating 
evidence and deemphasize the importance of convincing the Bureau to open 
an investigation. Requiring more investigative work from whistleblowers as 
a prerequisite to larger bounty awards would move the CFPB’s program 
closer to the balance of incentives that Professors Casey and Niblett 
suggest. 
More generally speaking, there is a dearth of empirical support for the 
intuition that “having stronger monetary incentives to blow the whistle 
 
155 See DePillis, supra note 30 (explaining how the CFPB “was designed as a Google-era 
regulator: a data-obsessed start-up, forever iterating, laser-focused on the safety of consumers 
rather than the soundness of banks”). 
156 See We’re 732 Days Old: Here’s What We’ve Been Up to, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU  
( July 22, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/hbd, archived at http://perma.cc/73W8-
P82M (listing the CFPB’s accomplishments as of its second birthday). 
157  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT: 
 JANUARY 1–DECEMBER 31, 2013 6 (2014), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_ 
cfpb_consumer-response-annual-report-complaints.pdf (“Since beginning to accept complaints 
[on] July 21, 2011 through February 28, 2014, the CFPB has handled approximately 309,700 
consumer complaints. Complaint volume has steadily increased, rising 80% from 91,000 in 2012 to 
163,700 in 2013.”). In evaluating this statistical trend, it is important to note that the Bureau has 
been periodically opening new categories of products to consumer complaints throughout the 
relevant time period. See id. (plotting the dates on which the CFPB opened various consumer 
financial product categories to customer complaints, from credit cards on July 21, 2011, to payday 
loans on November 6, 2013). 
158 See supra Section III.B (discussing changes for whistleblowers after the implementation of 
Dodd–Frank section 1057). 
159 Letter from Jeb Hensarling, supra note 85, at 2; see also Casey & Niblett, supra note 11, at 
1175 (arguing that an agency’s inability to identify high-quality whistleblower tips may “shift 
enforcement to other types of cases with less information asymmetry”). 
160 Indeed, Professors Casey and Niblett do not object to whistleblower bounties across the 
board; they simply argue that a qui tam mechanism balances incentives better than a model that 
requires only contacting law enforcement. Casey & Niblett, supra note 11, at 1211.  
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leads to more frivolous [enforcement].”161 Even if offering bounties requires 
the CFPB to allocate more resources toward implementing screening 
measures—such as devising a procedure for cross-checking tips against 
consumer complaints, reworking the Bureau’s approach to CIDS, or even 
establishing a whistleblower unit within the Office of Enforcement—this 
allocation will have salutary consequences. One key difference between the 
SEC’s nearly-silent Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 
(ITSFEA) program162 and its so-far-bustling163 Dodd–Frank program is 
that Dodd–Frank “institutionalized whistleblowing in the agency by 
creating an Office of the Whistleblower.”164 Agency responsiveness is the 
best incentive for informants to report. To the extent that sunk costs, 
reassigned staff, and earmarked funds nudge the Bureau toward continued 
attention to consumer financial informants, they bolster the Bureau’s 
reputation among consumer financial services employees and the plaintiffs’ 
bar as an enforcer to whom it is worth reporting.165 
 
161 Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by 
the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 123 (citing Dyck et 
al., supra note 11, at 2246). Professor Rapp bases this conclusion on Dyck and his coauthors’ 
finding that, despite the lure of False Claims Act bounty awards, healthcare whistleblowers lodge 
fewer frivolous claims than whistleblowers in other industries. Id.; see also SEC OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN. OFFICE OF AUDITS, REP. NO. 511, EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S WHISTLE-
BLOWER PROGRAM 23 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/ 
2013/511.pdf (stating that agency staff responsible for administering existing federal whistleblower 
programs “were not particularly concerned that award levels could induce illegitimate claims since 
they were confident their review process would weed out illegitimate claims through independent 
corroboration of asserted facts”). 
162 See Castellina, supra note 109, at 188 (“Prior to the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act, the 
SEC had a bounty program for informants who provided the SEC with tips regarding insider 
trading.”). 
163 See OWB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 82, at 8 (observing that the Commission received 
over 3000 whistleblower complaints in fiscal year 2013, as compared to just over 300 complaints in 
fiscal year 2011). 
164 Moberly, supra note 27, at 52 (citation omitted). 
165 Committing resources to follow up on whistleblower tips does not need to entail an  
undue limit on the discretionary, line-drawing enforcement activities for which the CFPB has 
exhibited a taste. To the extent that the CFPB is unwilling to take away too many resources from 
policy-oriented enforcement, it has a mechanism available to outsource the work. Dodd–Frank 
empowers state attorneys general to enforce the statutes the CFPB administers. CARTER ET AL., 
supra note 49, § 13.2.6. Cooperation with state attorneys general has been a hallmark of the 
CFPB’s early enforcement and supervisory actions, and there is no reason that should change in 
the context of a whistleblower program. See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
Federal Consumer Agency to Partner with State Regulators on Supervision of Providers of 
Consumer Financial Products and Services, Including Mortgage Lenders, Private Student 
Lenders and Payday Lenders ( Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
newsroom/consumer-agency-to-partner-with-state-regulators (discussing the Memorandum of 
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The second pertinent argument against whistleblower bounties also relates 
to responsiveness—in this case, the employer’s responsiveness, not that of 
law enforcement. Commentators fear that whistleblowers racing to cash in 
on “original” information will run directly to the agency, rather than 
reporting a problem to management or to the company’s own compliance 
personnel.166 Consequently, companies will have no reason to invest in their 
own compliance programs. 167  
This argument has intuitive resonance, but one could present a competing 
story. Bounties might foster, rather than discourage, investment in internal 
controls.168 Preliminary evidence related to the SEC’s program supports 
this hypothesis.169  
Existing research on whistleblower motivation170 indicates that (1) the 
threat of whistleblowers circumventing responsive compliance programs is 
low, and (2) bounties can nonetheless pressure companies to invest in these 
programs. Informants usually act out of a desire to correct misconduct, and 
although there is potential for retaliation, they tend to report concerns 
internally before going to the government.171 The most common reason 
whistleblowers forego internal channels such as company hotlines is because 
 
Understanding signed by federal and state regulators establishing coordination and cooperation for 
supervision of consumer financial service providers). 
166 See, e.g., Patrick Gnazzo & Joseph Murphy, Summary: An Insider Perspective on Whistleblower 
Programs (articulating the fear of “[m]any in the corporate community” that “employees will 
circumvent internal reporting channels in a race to obtain bounties”), in FOR WHOM THE 
WHISTLE BLOWS: ADVANCING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND INTEGRITY EFFORTS IN THE 
ERA OF DODD–FRANK 10, 10 (Michael D. Greenberg ed., 2011). 
167 Id.  
168 See Iskra Miralem, Comment, The SEC’s Whistleblower Program and Its Effect on Internal 
Compliance Programs, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 329, 332 (2011) (predicting that the bounty 
program’s short-term interference with extant compliance mechanisms will improve those 
mechanisms in the long run). This is the type of behavior that the CFPB is seeking to encourage 
from regulated entities. 
169 See Moberly, supra note 27, at 53 (describing “early evidence indicat[ing] that corporations 
have strengthened their internal systems out of fear that [Dodd–Frank section 922’s] financial 
rewards will entice employees to report to the SEC”). 
170 For a summary of the existing research, see supra note 169 and infra notes 171-172. 
171 See, e.g., ETHICS RES. CTR., BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON WORKPLACE MISCONDUCT 
5 (2010), available at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/WhistleblowerWP.pdf (describing National 
Business Ethics Survey data relating to whistleblowing between 2000 and 2009, which showed 
that only four percent of employees who reported wrongdoing contacted someone outside of the 
company before reporting internally); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Whistle-Blowers’ Experiences in 
Fraud Litigation Against Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1832, 1837 (2010) 
(surveying several unsealed federal qui tam cases against pharmaceutical manufacturers from 2001 
to 2009 and finding that “[g]enerally, whistle-blowers’ first move was to try to address problems 
internally”). 
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they do not believe their report will be treated seriously.172 If companies take 
meaningful steps to investigate reports, few employees will expose themselves 
to the social and professional repercussions that attend external whistleblowing 
without attempting to raise the matter in-house.  
Nonetheless, Professors Feldman and Lobel’s research into whistleblowing 
incentives indicates that people suspect others are most likely to blow the whistle 
in return for money.173 If consumer financial products companies believe 
their employees are inclined to pursue bounties, they have a stark financial 
incentive to invest in internal reporting channels that employees take 
seriously enough to use—channels which will reliably relay employee tips to 
upper management because CFPB policy proscribes leniency for self-
reported violations.174 In this context—and possibly in the securities fraud 
context as well—a bounty system is best understood as a means of influencing 
corporate governance, not just as an enforcement tool.175 
 
172 See GNAZZO & MURPHY, supra note 166, at 10 (“[T]he most important impediment to 
internal reporting by employees tends to be the perception that nobody is really listening.”).  
173 See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of 
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1202-03 
(2010) (“In the absence of a legal duty to report, the introduction of a higher financial reward is 
perceived to have the greatest impact on the reporting behavior of others . . . [and respondents] 
predicted that bounties would lead to significantly higher whistleblowing activity for nonpeers.”). 
174 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 2013-06 REASONABLE BUSINESS 
CONDUCT: SELF-POLICING, SELF-REPORTING, REMEDIATION, AND COOPERATION 2-5 (2013) 
(indicating that the Bureau will take into account many factors, including a party’s self-policing, 
self-reporting, remediation, and cooperation, when assessing penalties against that party). To date, 
the most prominent “whistleblower” that the CFPB’s Office of Enforcement has publically is a 
Connecticut mortgage lender, 1st Alliance Lending, LLC. See generally Consent Order, 1st Alliance 
Lending, LLC, No. 2014-CFPB-0003 (Feb. 24, 2014), 2014 WL 3685991. 1st Alliance not only 
admitted its own culpability for splitting unearned fees in contravention of RESPA section 8(b), 
it also disclosed the identity of the hedge fund that was its counterparty in the illegal arrangements. 
Id. at 3-4. 1st Alliance paid an $83,000 penalty, or $1000 for each loan connected to a split 
origination or loss-mitigation fee. Id. at 4. Gauging the leniency of this penalty is difficult without 
knowing the size of the fees involved, but RESPA does provide for fines of up to $10,000 dollars 
per violation, as well as damages “equal to three times the amount of any charge paid for such 
settlement service.” See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(1)-(2) (2012). 
Although the CFPB bulletin and consent order do not explain what prompted 1st Alliance to 
come forward, this is the type of behavior in which a company can be convinced to engage when 
employees and affiliates blow the whistle internally. 
175 See, e.g., Is Your Company Ready for the New Whistleblower Rules?, TO THE POINT  
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, Del.), Summer 2011, at 1, 4, available at http://www.pwc.com/us/ 
en/corporate-governance/assets/to-the-point-summer-2011.pdf (counseling that the best response 
to the SEC’s Dodd–Frank section 922 program consists of a public company’s audit committee 
captaining adjustments to company culture, hotlines, investigation action plans, and compliance 
department staffing); cf. Rapp, supra note 9, at 62 (calling for the cultivation of internal  
whistleblowers as a standard feature of American companies, because whistleblowers’ information 
“help[s] ensure more effective management of business firms,” which is “a classic objective of 
‘corporate governance’” (internal citations omitted)). 
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The discipline whistleblower bounties impose on compliance programs 
is particularly valuable in the consumer financial services arena, where 
ubiquitous mandatory arbitration agreements coupled with class-arbitration 
waivers impede private litigation.176 The CFPB has the authority to ban 
mandatory arbitration agreements in contracts for consumer financial 
services.177 Proponents of consumer financial services arbitration agreements 
argue that banning them would be a drastic misstep. In support of this 
argument, they point both to the rise of “consumer-friendly features”178 in 
such agreements, such as company-footed arbitration bills, that arguably 
“make arbitration more beneficial to the consumer than court litigation”179 
and to the economic benefits these agreements provide for consumer 
financial products companies by facilitating “streamlined proceedings, 
informality, [and] reduced cost.”180 A bounty program offers one way to 
compensate for arbitration agreements’ potential to slow the evolution of 
compliance programs in the consumer financial services industry without 
sacrificing the efficiencies that mandatory arbitration can generate for 
consumer financial service providers and their customers. 
 
176 In many industries, private litigation is a key driver of compliance development. See, e.g., 
Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal Liability: Qui Tam Actions, Corporate 
Integrity Agreements and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 625, 657 
(2007) (exploring the increasing role of private settlements in dictating corporate compliance 
programs, particularly in the healthcare industry). However, because creditors fear punitive 
damages, costly discovery, and damaging publicity, “[m]andatory arbitration provisions are nearly 
universal in consumer credit contracts.” See CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., CONSUMER CREDIT 
REGULATION: CREDIT CARDS, PAYDAY LOANS, AUTO FINANCE AND OTHER  
NON-MORTGAGE CREDIT § 7.4.1 (1st ed. 2012). 
Recent Supreme Court decisions have bolstered mandatory arbitration agreements by affirming 
companies’ rights to contractually bar customers from arbitrating their claims as a class. In AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), the Court dealt a “coup de grace . . . to 
consumer class actions” by upholding a class arbitration waiver in the face of a California 
precedent that declared mandatory arbitration agreements containing such provisions categorically 
unconscionable. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012). By a 5-4 count, the Court 
found that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California’s rule. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753; 
see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (rejecting the 
argument that class arbitration waivers could be unenforceable on a case-by-case basis where they 
make vindicating the customer’s federal statutory rights impractically expensive).  
177 Before banning mandatory arbitration agreements, the Bureau must conduct a study of 
such agreements and present its findings to Congress. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a)-(b) (2012). See generally 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS: SECTION 
1028(A) STUDY RESULTS TO DATE (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf. 
178 Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: What Does the 
Future Hold After Concepcion?, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 345, 346 (2013). 
179 Id.  
180 Id. at 357.  
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This line of reasoning leads to, and answers, a question that arose  
regarding the SEC and CFTC programs: 181  should the CFPB make  
whistleblowers ineligible for a bounty unless they first report internally, in 
order to ensure that companies’ investments in compliance programs do not 
go in vain?182 If part of bounties’ effectiveness at attracting investment in 
internal compliance programs derives from the need to build employees’ 
confidence in those programs, such a requirement would undercut the very 
purpose of a bounty program. 
Questions about the prerequisites for receiving a bounty relate to the 
creation and design of a CFPB program, which the rest of this Comment 
discusses.  
B. Implementing a CFPB Bounty Rule 
Relative to its bureaucratic ancestors, the CFPB has “efficient and 
straightforward” rulemaking power.183 The Consumer Financial Protection 
Act authorizes the director of the Bureau to “prescribe rules and issue 
orders and guidance, as may be necessary or appropriate to enable the 
Bureau to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the 
Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions thereof.”184 Under 
this broad delegation of legislative authority, the Bureau has several avenues 
for promulgating whistleblower bounty regulations. 
The ideal approach would be to guarantee the whistleblower an adjustable 
percentage of any civil penalties the CFPB assesses in reliance on infor-
mation provided by the whistleblower. The Bureau could accomplish this 
by amending its Civil Penalty Fund Rule to allocate the first ten to thirty 
percent of penalties the Bureau imposes to whistleblowers who provide 
information or other assistance integral to the underlying enforcement 
action.185  
The CFPA created the Civil Penalty Fund (CPF), which collects the 
proceeds of civil penalties received by the Bureau and distributes “payments 
to the victims of activities for which civil penalties have been imposed 
 
181 For a further description of this question, see Securities Whistleblower Incentives and 
Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300-01 ( June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249 
(2014)) (noting that “[c]ommenters were sharply divided on the issues raised by” the “interplay of 
the whistleblower program and company internal compliance processes”).  
182 For a summary of the SEC’s response to this issue, see infra note 230. 
183 See Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and Stronger 
Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 405, 414 (2013) (comparing rulemaking authority of the CFPB to that of 
the FTC). 
184 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (2012). 
185 See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104 (2014) (codifying the CFPB’s current Civil Penalty Fund rule). 
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under the Federal consumer financial laws.”186 The Bureau’s current rule 
generally requires the CPF’s administrator to direct money toward injured 
consumers for “uncompensated harm,” where feasible.187  
This rule demonstrates the breadth of discretion Congress granted the 
CFPB in distributing civil penalty proceeds. Most saliently, in promulgating 
the CPF rule, the Bureau necessarily subordinated the interests of some 
injured consumers to the interests of others. For example, in a period where 
uncompensated consumer harm exceeds available CPF reserves, the  
administrator must pay the most recently harmed class of consumers first.188 
But this rule also makes a less obvious judgment call about how to order the 
interests of “victims.” The CFPA simply permits the Bureau to make 
“payments” to anyone “victim[ized]” by a violation of federal consumer 
financial law that provokes a civil penalty.189 Nothing in the statutory 
language limits the Bureau to paying victimized consumers, nor does the 
statute confine CPF payments to the amount of a victim’s uncompensated 
harm.  
The CFPA’s definitions section does not define “victim.” 190 Dictionary 
definitions of the term encompass anyone harmed by a given action.191 
Under this reading of the term, employee whistleblowers are “victims” of 
the federal consumer financial violations they report in at least two senses. 
First, violations expose a company to liability,192 which works to the  
detriment of all of the company’s employees through layoffs, liquidation, or 
other potentially adverse consequences. The harm may be more attenuated 
in certain situations than in others, but, again, the CFPA’s terms empower 
the Bureau to pay victims from the CPF, not to make them whole or 
 
186 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2) (2012). The statute also allows the Bureau to use the CPF for 
sponsoring “consumer education and financial literacy programs” where “victims cannot be located 
or [paying victims is] otherwise not practicable.” Id. 
187 See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.106 (2014) (governing the allocation of funds to victims). 
188 Id. § 1075.106(b)(1). 
189 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2) (2012). 
190  Id. § 5481. The current CPF rule defines victims eligible for payments from the Fund as 
those “harmed” by a “violation or violations” for which “a final order in a Bureau enforcement 
action imposed a civil penalty.” 12 C.F.R. § 1075.103 (2014). 
191 Merriam–Webster offers numerous definitions of “victim.” Two of these focus on the 
subject being “cheated or fooled” or “tricked or duped,” which more closely fits consumers in this 
context. Victim, MERRIAM–WEBSTER (last visited Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/victim, archived at http://perma.cc/7FV3-TEZ3. However, other 
definitions sweep much wider: “a person who has been . . . injured . . . by someone else,” 
“someone . . . that is harmed by an unpleasant event,” “one that is acted on and usually adversely 
affected by a force,” and “one that is injured . . . under any of various conditions.” Id.  
192 At the point where the Bureau divvies up new fines in the CPF, the company or its  
insurer has already incurred the CFPB penalty’s cost. 
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provide restitution.193 The CFPA also omits any express requirement of 
materiality or proximate causation.194  
Second, the vast majority of whistleblowers face retaliation from their 
employers, and almost all experience painful psychological and social 
repercussions.195 Congress recognized this fact in Dodd–Frank section 1057. 
Again, there is room for debate about what extent the company’s legal 
violation “causes” this type of harm if the statute does not impose an 
affirmative duty to report, but the Bureau has a colorable position. 
Although the argument for revising the CPF rule to treat whistleblowers 
as “victims” may not be overwhelmingly persuasive, courts should afford 
the Bureau some leeway because it is interpreting an ambiguous and 
undefined term in a statute it administers.196 If consumer financial service 
providers challenge the revised rule as arbitrary and capricious under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Bureau’s legal conclusion should 
be entitled to Chevron deference.197 This standard of review is, in theory, 
 
193 See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d) (2012).  
194 The clearest argument for causation arises in connection with smaller entities, large-scale 
illegality, or in situations where employees hold company stock. Serious violations of federal 
consumer financial law could bring about penalties large enough to shut down a business or force 
it to make layoffs, potentially costing an internal whistleblower her job. At a smaller firm, the 
same results could follow from more modest penalties. And at larger, publicly traded businesses, 
an enforcement action—or the investing public’s reaction to the announcement of the action or 
the underlying illegal conduct—could reduce the company’s value, thereby injuring employee–
stockholders. 
195 See Legislative Proposals to Address the Negative Consequence of the Dodd–Frank Whistleblower 
Provisions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 59 (2011) (statement of Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Professor of Law, 
Univ. of Toledo College of Law) (describing employer retaliation and other consequences faced by 
whistleblowers, including “severe social ostracism” and “personal hardship”). 
196 If the CFPB concludes that this argument is too tenuous, one alternative would be to 
draw whistleblower bounties from other sources of recovery available to the CFPB that do not 
share civil penalties’ express restrictions on the disposition of the funds procured. The CPFA 
grants the Bureau a wide range of remedies, including disgorgement, money damages, and “other 
monetary relief.” 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2) (2012). Although the practice of using these funds to pay 
whistleblower bounties stands in tension with the reparative purpose of remedies such as 
disgorgement, the SEC’s efforts to stretch disgorgement beyond its equitable roots have received 
judicial acceptance. See Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. ONLINE 1, 12 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/?p=3528, archived at http://perma.cc/7W2E-6DNJ 
(arguing that disgorgement often functions as “a legal remedy akin to a simple money judgment” 
in SEC enforcement cases). 
197 See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (articulating the 
Chevron test which provides that when a statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific 
issue at hand” the agency “may exercise its reasonable discretion in construing the statute” 
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))). For 
Chevron purposes, “[a] statute is considered ambiguous if it can be read more than one way.” 
AFL–CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
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highly deferential, although empirical studies cast doubt on whether 
Chevron’s application actually leads to more courts upholding agency 
interpretations.198 Whether the court treats the CFPB’s rule revision under 
Chevron’s laissez-faire mandate or under some more strict species of  
reasonableness review, the reading of the CFPB’s organic statute at issue 
here furthers a cogent policy goal in keeping with the Bureau’s mission to 
“prevent evasions” of federal consumer financial law199 and its objective of 
consistent enforcement.200 Section 1057 expresses a congressional desire for 
the CFPB to foster consumer financial services whistleblowing,201 and data 
from the SEC’s OWB demonstrates that financial awards tied to law 
enforcement recoveries are an effective way to attract more informants.202 
 
Chevron deference is inappropriate when an agency’s interpretation does not produce a  
reasonable policy result. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. Opponents to a consumer financial  
whistleblower bounty program may argue that such a program unreasonably circumvents the 
DOL’s place in Dodd–Frank’s statutory scheme. Here, although CFPB-administered bounties do, 
in a very broad sense, reduce the Bureau’s reliance on the DOL, they do not truly undercut the 
DOL’s role in the Dodd–Frank framework. Under Dodd–Frank section 1057, just as under 
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806, the DOL serves as a gatekeeper over private litigation and a watchdog for 
whistleblowers with retaliation complaints. Neither of these purposes is usurped or diminished by 
adding another incentive for employees to blow the whistle in the first place. If more whistleblowers 
come forward, perhaps more will suffer retaliation and thereby increase OSHA’s responsibilities, 
but the same is true of any step that the Bureau takes to encourage informants. For example, few 
would accuse the CFPB of overreaching when it added dedicated channels for tips. 
198 See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 173-76 (2010) (finding that 
agency interpretations prevailed 64-73% of the time when courts claimed to be applying Chevron); 
see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011) (consolidating studies and finding 60–81.3% affirmance rate under 
Chevron). 
199 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (2012). 
200 See id. § 5511(a)-(b) (outlining the CFPB’s purpose and objectives). 
201 See id. § 5567(a)(1) (protecting employees’ provision of information to the Bureau by 
prohibiting retaliation against whistleblowers in general terms); id. § 5567(d) (rendering such 
employee rights unwaivable and immune to mandatory arbitration agreements). The statute’s lack 
of a legislatively mandated bounty mechanism, such as those in Dodd–Frank sections 728 and 922, 
merely reflects Congress’s decision not to micromanage the resources of an agency that is much 
newer than the CFTC or SEC and which has not yet demonstrated the type of inattention to 
whistleblowers that would necessitate institutionalization similar to that by the OWB or WBO. 
Note that the statute did not even require the Bureau to erect the minimal whistleblower 
infrastructure, namely a hotline and dedicated e-mail address, that the CFPB has chosen to 
institute thus far. See id. § 5512(c)(4)(B) (merely stating that the Bureau “may gather and compile 
information from a variety of sources, including examination reports concerning covered persons 
or service providers, consumer complaints, voluntary surveys and voluntary interviews of 
consumers, surveys and interviews with covered persons and service providers, and review of 
available databases” (emphasis added), but not requiring the Bureau to adopt a particular 
methodology of information gathering). That is, Dodd–Frank section 1057 protects reporting but 
leaves the means of facilitating such reports up to the Bureau’s discretion. 
202 See OWB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 82, at 8 (reporting a 7.9% increase in the volume 
of whistleblower tips between fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2013). 
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Before judicial review becomes an issue, though, the Bureau’s  
rulemakings must satisfy the CFPA’s special procedural requirements. 
Generally, these requirements resemble the standard notice-and-comment 
obligations that the APA imposes on any informal rulemaking.203  For 
example, although the CFPB does not need to submit rules to OIRA, it 
must conduct its own cost–benefit analysis of the proposed rule’s impact on 
both “covered persons” and consumers.204 As part of this analysis, the 
CFPA directs the Bureau to assess the rule’s potential to reduce consumers’ 
access to consumer financial products205—a result which is unlikely to follow 
from a rule that facilitates a more reactive CFPB enforcement strategy, as 
opposed to prohibiting new categories of activity—and the rule’s impact on 
rural consumers,206 which should not be pronounced in this instance.  
Similarly, the CFPA instructs the Bureau to confer with the prudential 
regulators “regarding [a proposed rule’s] consistency with prudential, 
market, or systemic objectives,”207 but if a regulator presents a written 
objection, all the Bureau must do is include an explanation of the regulator’s 
concern and of the Bureau’s decision in the rule’s adopting release.208  
After satisfying these modest requirements, however, the CFPB faces a 
final hurdle that is at least theoretically more daunting: the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) can veto CFPB rules.209 In a paper 
published shortly after Dodd–Frank’s enactment, Professor Barkow  
observed that this “veto threat appear[ed] to be the greatest limit on the 
[Bureau’s] independence.”210 This label made sense at the time, given that 
“[m]ost of [FSOC’s voting] members have a long history of favoring the 
 
203 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (establishing procedures for informal rulemaking). Although 
this Comment proposes a rule amendment rather than an altogether new rule, a whistleblower 
system is not a “logical outgrowth” of the originally proposed CPF rule, so the Bureau will need to 
renotice the change. See Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525, 
533 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“An agency adopting final rules that differ from its proposed rules is 
required to renotice when the changes are so major that the original notice did not adequately 
frame the subjects for discussion.”). 
204 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
205 Id.  
206 Id. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
207 Id. § 5512(b)(2)(B). 
208 Id. § 5512(b)(2)(C). In addition to these front-end constraints, “significant” CFPB rules 
also require a second round of review within five years of their effective date. Id. § 5512(d)(1)-(2). 
The Bureau must provide another opportunity to comment and suggest modifications to the rule 
during this review. Id. § 5512(d)(3). Following the comment period, the Bureau must publish a 
report reflecting its assessment of reasonably available evidence as it relates to “relevant factors,” 
including the rule’s “effectiveness . . . in meeting the purposes and objectives [of the CFPA] and 
the specific goals stated by the Bureau.” Id. § 5512(d)(1). 
209 See id. § 5513(c)(3)(A) (providing for FSOC veto by a two-thirds vote). 
210 Barkow, supra note 55, at 78. 
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industries they are charged with regulating.”211 For example, the Secretary 
of the Treasury chairs the Council, and its other nine voting members 
include, along with the director of the CFPB and an independent insurance 
expert212 appointed by the president: the chairpersons of the CFTC, Federal 
Reserve, FDIC, NCUA, and SEC; the Comptroller of the Currency; and the 
director of the FHFA.213 
To exercise its veto power, the FSOC must conclude by a two-thirds 
vote that the rule in question “put[s] the safety and soundness of the United 
States banking system or the stability of the financial system of the United States 
at risk.”214 This is a challenging standard; indeed, its stringency has been the 
target of recent House of Representatives bills seeking to increase oversight 
of the CFPB.215 As a U.S. Chamber of Commerce representative pointed 
out at a Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs hearing 
regarding such legislation, “rules that threaten the safety and soundness of 
some financial institutions, or even an entire sector of the financial system, 
but do not arise to the level of posing a systemic risk, would not appear to 
qualify” for a veto by the FSOC.216 
Concluding that reinforcing Dodd–Frank section 1057’s incentive structure 
for consumer financial whistleblowers with bounties poses a systemic risk to 
American banking or finance requires some mental stretching. But if the 
CFPB believed that FSOC review seriously imperiled its whistleblower 
bounty rule, it could make a veto even more difficult to justify by exempting 
 
211 Id. at 75; see also Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 213 
(2013) (“[C]ritics of the veto are concerned that many of the FSOC’s members share a common 
pro-banking industry bias.”(citing Enhanced Consumer Financial Protection After the Financial Crisis: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 13-15 (2011) (statement 
of Adam J. Levitin, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) [hereinafter Enhanced 
Consumer Financial Protection])). 
212 President Obama appointed S. Roy Woodall, Jr., the former General Counsel and  
Insurance Commissioner of Kentucky, to this post in May 2011. S. Roy Woodall, Jr., U.S. DEP’T 
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/council/Pages/roy_woodall.aspx (last 
updated Oct. 23, 2012, 9:53 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/4H5X-XCJK.  
213 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1) (2012). 
214 Id. § 5513(a), (c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
215 See Alec C. Covington, Note, Fighting Yesterday’s Battles: Proposed Changes to the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 299, 306-07 (2012) (citing bills proposing 
modifications of the CFPB, including the Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness 
Improvement Act, H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. (2011), and the Communities First Act, H.R. 1697, 112th 
Cong. (2011)). 
216 Enhanced Consumer Financial Protection, 112th Cong. 90-91 (2011) (statement of Andrew J. 
Pincus, U.S. Chamber of Commerce); see also id. (arguing that FSOC “review authority is 
unlikely to place any meaningful constraint on the CFPB” and is “essentially illusory”).  
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employees of very large depositories, as defined by the CFPA,217 and 
systematically important (nondepository) financial intuitions (SIFIs), as 
designated by the Council, from bounty eligibility.218 Bounties add less 
value at such institutions, which are more heavily supervised and have been 
historically accustomed to regulation, than at the more distant corners of the 
CFPB’s enforcement sphere where supervision is more rare and compliance 
programs less developed. 
 C. Design Concerns 
In fashioning a whistleblower bounty rule, or enacting new whistleblower 
legislation, the drafters should use the SEC’s program under Dodd–Frank 
section 922 as a model and award informants a variable percentage of any 
recovery that the Bureau achieves in reliance on their information. A 
system that relies on the agency to bring enforcement actions, such as the 
new SEC program, is preferable to a qui tam mechanism that allows 
whistleblowers to sue on the government’s behalf inasmuch as the CFPB 
seeks to retain some ability to make policy through enforcement actions. 
Additionally, although qui tam systems can provide a desirable check on an 
agency with a proclivity for ignoring tips, the CFPB’s structure already 
facilitates the consistent pursuit of relevant information.  
As for the percentage of the Bureau’s recovery that should be paid to a 
successful informant, the guiding principle should be incentivizing whistle-
blowers to continue cooperating and investigating after contacting the 
CFPB and after encountering resistance from management or coworkers.219 
One consequence of this strategy is that the Bureau will need a wide 
range of permissible award percentages so that it can increase compensation 
for informants who go the extra mile to preserve evidence or conduct 
further research. The ten to thirty percent guaranteed by the other two 
 
217 See 12 U.S.C. § 5515 (2012) (referring to insured depository institutions and credit unions 
with assets of more than ten billion dollars as “very large banks, savings associations, and credit 
unions”). 
218 See State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127, 135 (D.D.C. 2013) 
 (explaining FSOC’s authority to designate an institution as a SIFI, where “material financial 
distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, 
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could pose a 
threat to the financial stability of the United States” (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (a)(1) (2012))). 
219 For a discussion of the benefits that accompany this approach, see supra subsection IV.A.2. 
This goal does not require changing the Bureau’s policy of allowing whistleblowers to remain 
anonymous, even if they fail to retain an attorney that the Bureau can contact; informants whose 
cooperation can be driven by cash will voluntarily identify themselves in the hopes of being able 
to claim an award later. 
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Dodd–Frank programs is a sensible range and would be an easy number for 
the Bureau to defend against judicial or FSOC review by pointing to 
Dodd–Frank sections 748 and 922. If the Bureau or Congress wanted to 
limit the amount of money diverted from direct consumer recompense, it 
could lower the ceiling from thirty percent to the FCA’s minimum of 
twenty-five percent for cases in which the government intervenes. 220 
Dropping the cap further to the IRS program’s minimum of fifteen percent 
is inadvisable, because in cases with modest but significant recoveries, such 
as the minimum one million dollars required to trigger award eligibility 
under Dodd–Frank sections 728 and 922, the five percent gap between a 
minimum award and a maximum award may represent less than $100,000.221  
In other respects, the goal of encouraging whistleblowers to develop 
their tips counsels against mimicking the Dodd–Frank section 922 regime. 
The SEC’s process for determining the amount of an individual informant’s 
award depends on seven nonweighted factors, including “the degree of 
assistance” a whistleblower provides the SEC in its investigation,222 the 
“significance of the information provided,”223 the timeliness of the whistle-
 
220 See EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 161, at 24 
tbl.5 (comparing the range of permissible whistleblower award amounts, based on a percentage of 
the funds the agency recovers, among the SEC, CFTC, IRS, and DOJ regimes). 
221 Professors Feldman and Lobel found that “low rewards” of $1000 are inefficient incentives 
and may even discourage whistleblowers, whereas “high reward[s]” of $100,000 are far more 
effective. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 173, at 1190-92. Continuing with the example of a $1 
million base recovery, because the professors’ study does not demonstrate that a $50,000 award is 
guaranteed to be ineffectual, further empirical study of whistleblower motivation could shed more 
light on the question. See EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 
161, at 22 (“[F]ew empirical studies have been done on how monetary award levels influence 
whistleblowing behavior.”). However, $50,000 is unlikely to provide sufficient incentive for a 
potential whistleblower to come forward, considering the long-term damage that blowing the 
whistle tends to inflict on informants’ careers. See id. at 23 (“[H]igh rewards can motivate 
potential whistleblowers to come forward because the monetary amount may mitigate the cost of 
professional and social sanctions that can result.”). By comparison, the DOL found in 2012 that 
the median annual wage for U.S. loan officers was about $60,000. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2014-15 EDITION: 
LOAN OFFICERS, available at http://www.bls.gov/ooh/business-and-financial/loan-officers.htm.  
One way to deal with the problem of making available only a narrow range of possible  
rewards, while still maintaining a low cap, would be to eliminate the ten percent floor. However, 
no similar federal whistleblower regime, namely those operated by the SEC, CFTC, IRS, and 
DOJ, guarantees awards of less than ten percent. See EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROGRAM, supra note 161, at 24 tbl.5. The same concerns that weigh against a five percent spread 
between the minimum and maximum suggest that a five percent minimum may be ineffectual and 
that a meaningful award floor is a key component of a whistleblower bounty system. Id. at 22-23 
(paraphrasing the chief of the OWB’s opinion that a “guaranteed award amount mitigates the risk 
to whistleblowers’ employment prospects or reputation”).  
222 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(2) (2014).  
223 Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(1).  
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blower’s initial report, 224  and the whistleblower’s interaction with the 
company’s “internal compliance systems.”225 According to the chief of the 
SEC’s whistleblower office, the Commission has not applied this complicated 
formula through “mathematical, scientific, [or] step-by-step process[es].”226  
How can a system as rife with ex ante uncertainty as the SEC’s convince 
an employee to engage in any of the activities that the system’s component 
factors aim to encourage? Instead, the CFPB should determine awards 
based solely on the extent of the assistance a whistleblower provides. This 
single criterion impounds, to a degree, the considerations behind the SEC’s 
“significance of the information provided” factor;227 it also does away with 
the unnecessary228 attempt to make award amounts play a role in convincing 
whistleblowers to report internally.229 
Finally, the Bureau’s program should depart from its sisters’ incorporation 
of a minimum recovery requirement for award eligibility.230 An agency-
centric model, as opposed to one predicated on qui tam suits, allows the 
Bureau ultimate discretion over whether to pursue a tip. Once the Bureau 
has enough information to believe it is investigating an inconsequential 
violation, it can simply stop investigating. Conversely, if the tip initially 
seems important enough that the Bureau decides it is worth following up 
with an enforcement action, there is no reason to penalize the whistleblower 
for reporting what appeared to be valuable information.  
CONCLUSION 
A well-designed system of bounty awards for consumer financial  
whistleblowers would further the CFPB’s objectives by enhancing the 
 
224 Id. § 240.21F-6(2)(ii).  
225 Id. 
226 See Ensign, supra note 133. 
227 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(1) (2014).  
228 See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text. 
229 Confronted by widespread concern over a bounty program’s potential to undermine 
companies’ existing compliance departments, the SEC has made several changes to its rules. See 76 
Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300-01 (2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249 (2014)) (explaining the 
inclusion of regulatory mechanisms designed to foster internal reporting). Although the Commission 
rejected comments urging it to require that whistleblowers report malfeasance to the company 
before contacting the agency, it decided to include “whether, and the extent to which, a  
whistleblower assisted any internal investigation or inquiry concerning the reported securities 
violations,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.2lF-6(a)(4)(ii) (2014), as one of many factors that may increase an 
award, and a whistleblower’s interference with internal reporting systems as a factor that may 
decrease an award. Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3). 
230 Both the CFTC and SEC programs require a total of at least one million dollars in  
monetary sanctions before entitling whistleblowers to a share. 7 U.S.C. § 26(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012); 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012). 
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Bureau’s enforcement capabilities—especially to the extent that those 
capabilities are divorced from the Bureau’s supervisory functions—and by 
accelerating the growth of compliance programs at consumer financial 
services companies unaccustomed to regulatory oversight. The system could 
also benefit consumer financial service providers by encouraging the Bureau 
to undertake less policy-making enforcement, as opposed to following 
insider evidence and using rulemaking to set clear standards under which 
whistleblowers can confidently report. The Bureau might even have one less 
reason to ban mandatory arbitration agreements in consumer financial 
contracts, because the threat of whistleblowers could correct for the limitations 
such agreements place on private litigation as a motive for companies to 
invest in compliance. But even if consumer financial product providers react 
poorly to the idea of a government agency paying their employees to rat on 
them, a CFPB rulemaking implementing this idea stands a fighting chance 
of surviving FSOC and judicial review. Either Congress or the Bureau 
should exercise its lawmaking power to ensure that whistleblowers have a 
reliable incentive to report infringements of federal consumer financial law, 
now and in the future. 
